Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Douglas?PattersonEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, 201 Dickens Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA |
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Abstract: | Controversy has arisen of late over the claim that deflationism about truth requires that we explain meaning in terms of something other than truth-conditions. This controversy, it is argued, is due to unclarity as to whether the basic deflationary claim that a sentence and a sentence that attributes truth to it are equivalent in meaning is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the object language for which we develop an account of meaning, or is intended to involve the truth-predicate of the metalanguage in which we develop an account of meaning. The former view is compatible with the truth-conditional theory of meaning for the object language, the latter is incompatible with it. However, the former view is also trivially true; hence we should endorse the claim that any form of deflationism worth being interested in is incompatible with understanding meaning truth-conditionally. |
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