| Abstract: | In an age in which vast progress has been made in organ transplant technology, it is imperative to determine the point at which a human being is considered dead, for transplantation cannot occur until after death. Traditional religious views imply that a human being is dead upon the departure of the soul from the body. Taking the biological death of the body as a conclusive sign of the soul's departure is not an option. Biological death refers to decomposition, and this cannot equate to the death of the person as such, for this would make the concept and practice of transplantation absurd, for transplantable parts of a biologically dead—i.e. decomposing—body could not be used. On the other hand, if parts of the human body are themselves still biologically alive, could it not be said that taking such parts would amount to murder? Two conclusions follow from this predicament. First, death as a ‘normative’ concept stands in sharp distinction from a purely biological concept. Second, a normative concept of death is entangled with a normative concept of personhood. That is to say, from the moment that a human being is not considered a person as such, parts of the body could be removed for transplantation or, indeed, for any other justified medical purpose. In this regard, various theories of the person are put forward. Which of these theories is compatible with a workable concept of death? In this paper two principal theories of the person will be discussed and it will be argued that a brain-based theory of death is conducive to a normative concept of death, thus allowing for organ transplantation. |
