A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice |
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Authors: | Paul Weirich |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Social Sciences, California State Polytechnic University, 91768-4053 Pomona, CA, U.S.A. |
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Abstract: | I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules. |
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