The Basis of Self-Knowledge |
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Authors: | Quassim Cassam |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK |
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Abstract: | I discuss the claim what makes self-knowledge epistemologically distinctive is the fact that it is baseless or groundless.
I draw a distinction between evidential and explanatory baselessness and argue that self-knowledge is only baseless in the
first of these senses. Since evidential baselessness is a relatively widespread phenomenon the evidential baselessness of
self-knowledge does not make it epistemologically distinctive and does not call for any special explanation. I do not deny
that self-knowledge is epistemologically distinctive. My claim is only that talk of its evidential baselessness is insufficient
to account for its epistemological distinctiveness.
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