Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge |
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Authors: | KJ Kraay |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 215 Huron Street, Toronto, ON, Canada, M5S 1A1 |
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Abstract: | Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response tothis charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value. |
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