A critique of van Fraassen's voluntaristic epistemology |
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Authors: | Jonathan L. Kvanvig |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Texas A&M University, 77843-4237 College Station, TX, USA |
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Abstract: | Van Fraassen's epistemology is forged from two commitments, one to a type of Bayesianism and the other to what he terms voluntarism. Van Fraassen holds that if one is going to follow a rule in belief-revision, it must be a Bayesian rule, but that one does not need to follow a rule in order to be rational. It is argued that van Fraassen's arguments for rejecting non-Bayesian rules is unsound, and that his voluntarism is subject to a fatal dilemma arising from the non-monotonic character of reasoning. |
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