| Abstract: | This article addresses two related themes: (1) the interface between clinical research and contemporary philosophy of science, and (2) sociopsychological processes as they are reflected in clinical research. It is argued that our research efforts in clinical psychology continue to be dominated by logical empiricism, an epistemology that has failed to survive recent criticisms stemming from the refinement of our conceptions of explicit rationality. The self-contradictory paradox faced by logical empiricism and all other justificational approaches to knowledge is avoided by the nonjustificational perspectives that have developed over the last two decades. Clinical researchers are urged to reappraise the assumptions and implications of conventional epistemologies and to explore the alternatives emerging from these more recent developments in philosophy of science. The second part of the article argues that human psychological processes are an imperative topic of inquiry in an adequate model of science. Knowledge can be viewed as an active process of constructing order; as such, its analysis requires an understanding of the knower and psychological knowing processes. This point is illustrated and elaborated in four commentaries on contemporary inference traditions, the shifting sands of parochialism in clinical psychology, the popularity of molecular research, and the tyranny of technique in our research and practice. Concluding remarks are addressed to the adequacy of contemporary graduate education and the responsibilities attendant on our roles as scientists, teachers, and practitioners of psychology. |
