真值条件内容非实在论

错误论和非事实论是用语义方式表述的两种不同形态的非实在论,当中涉及"真"、"假"、"指称"、"真值条件"这样的语义概念。布高西昂认为,针对真值条件内容概念的错误论和非事实论是内在地不一致的,从而可以先验地予以拒绝。本文详细分析布高西昂的论证,揭示其论证的缺陷,以及分析布高西昂与其批评者达维特之间的争议,消除他们对用于表述非实在论的语义概念的误解,尝试为真值条件内容非实在论给出一致的表述。

Truth-conditional Content Irrealism

The error theory and non-factualism are two different forms of irrealism, which are formulated in semantic terms such as ＂true＂, ＂false＂, ＂reference＂ and ＂truth conditions＂. The error thesis of a given area of discourse is the view that although the central predicates of that area refer to properties and the atomic declarative sentences containing them have truth conditions, since nothing has the properties referred to by these predicates, those sentences are systematically false. While on the non-factualist＇s view, the central predicates fail to refer to any properties, so the sentences containing them do not have truth conditions, hence can not be true or false. Boghossian claims that both the error thesis and the non-factualist thesis about truth-conditional content are incoherent, hence could be rejected on purely transcendental grounds. In this paper I examine Boghossian＇s arguments, disclose their defects, and consider the debate between Boghossian and his critic Devitt, clear up some misunderstandings on the semantic notions they use to formulate irrealism, and try to give a coherent formulation for truth-conditional content irrealism.