The Identity Status Approach: In Need of Fundamental Revision and Qualitative Change

This article is a response to the commentaries of Waterman (this issue) and Berzonsky and Adams (this issue) on my review of the identity status field (van Hoof, this issue). The commentaries illustrate that the identity status researchers attribute different meanings to the identity statuses and identity status research; while Waterman finds it difficult to recognize the field in my review, Berzonsky and Adams agree with several of my conclusions. The two commentaries represent two pillars on which the status approach rests. The difference between the review and the commentaries is that the first includes both pillars, whereas each commentary consists primarily of a selective presentation of assumptions and data. This response focuses on two main points of the commentaries: (a) are the statuses sufficiently validated? and (b) to what extent are they suitable for testing developmental identity hypotheses? Using specific examples I show that the line of reasoning in the commentaries and the data proposed in support of these arguments in fact often support the conclusions of my review, for I demonstrate that the statuses are insufficiently validated and that the statuses are unsuitable for measuring identity development. These conclusions call for a fundamental revision of the identity status approach and a qualitative change in identity theory and research. Finally, the alternative approaches presented by Berzonsky and Adams are evaluated with respect to their contribution to an indispensable qualitative change in the identity status field.