Thinking about representations: the case of opaque contexts |
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Authors: | Kamawar Deepthi Olson David R |
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Affiliation: | a Institute of Cognitive Science and Department of Psychology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1S 5B7;b Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1V6 |
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Abstract: | To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children’s performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb “know”) and poorest for intentional opacity (using “mean to”), with quotational opacity (using “said”) falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children’s sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed. |
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Keywords: | Opaque contexts Referential opacity Theory of mind Representation Metarepresentation False belief |
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