A Hobbesian derivation of the principle of universalization |
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Authors: | Michael Moehler |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Virginia Tech, 229 Major Williams Hall, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA |
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Abstract: | In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More
specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision
situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed
to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The
analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the
categorical imperative. |
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Keywords: | |
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