Implicit definition and the application of logic |
| |
Authors: | Thomas Kroedel |
| |
Institution: | 1.Department of Philosophy,Humboldt University of Berlin,Berlin,Germany;2.Institut für Philosophie,Humboldt-Universit?t zu Berlin,Berlin,Germany |
| |
Abstract: | The paper argues that the theory of Implicit Definition cannot give an account of knowledge of logical principles. According
to this theory, the meanings of certain expressions are determined such that they make certain principles containing them
true; this is supposed to explain our knowledge of the principles as derived from our knowledge of what the expressions mean.
The paper argues that this explanation succeeds only if Implicit Definition can account for our understanding of the logical
constants, and that fully understanding a logical constant in turn requires the ability to apply it correctly in particular
cases. It is shown, however, that Implicit Definition cannot account for this ability, even if it draws on introduction rules
for the logical constants. In particular, Implicit Definition cannot account for our ability to apply negation in particular
cases. Owing to constraints relating to the unique characterisation of logical constants, invoking the notion of rejection
does not remedy the situation. Given its failure to explain knowledge of logic, the prospects of Implicit Definition to explain
other kinds of a priori knowledge are even worse. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|