| Abstract: | Vice epistemology is in the business of defining epistemic vice. One of the proposed requirements of epistemic vices is that they are reprehensible—blameworthy in a non‐voluntarist way. Our problem, as vice epistemologists, is giving an analysis of non‐voluntarist responsibility that will count just the right qualities, no more and no less, as epistemic vices. If our analysis of non‐voluntarist responsibility ends up being too narrow, then it risks excluding some qualities that we want to count as epistemic vices, such as implicit biases. Whereas, if it ends up being too broad, it risks including qualities that we do not want to count as epistemic vices, such as impaired vision. I recommend a three‐step program for vice epistemologists: 1. admit that we have a responsibility problem; 2. strive to define the responsibility problem; 3. work together with specialists in non‐voluntarist responsibility to solve the responsibility problem. |
