Testimonial hinges

The paper presents an extension of the kind of hinge epistemology proposed in Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (Coliva 2015) to the case of testimonial justification. This extension stems naturally from a reinterpretation of the classic dispute between reductionists and anti‐reductionists with respect to testimonial justification. The interesting and novel aspect of that reinterpretation is that it brings to light the deep analogy between that classic dispute and the contemporary debate between so‐called “liberals” and “conservatives” with respect to the structure of perceptual justification. The paper first presents the reinterpretation; it subsequently proposes the extension of hinge epistemology to the case of testimonial justification; it then turns to a detailed discussion of the exact “hinges” testimonial justification is taken to depend on, and closes by considering some possible objections.