Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism |
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Authors: | René van Woudenberg Ronald Meester |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, VU University, , 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;2. Department of Mathematics, VU University, , 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification. |
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Keywords: | David Atkinson infinite epistemic regress infinitism internalism Jeanne Peijnenburg |
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