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An intensional epistemic logic
Authors:Yue J. Jiang
Affiliation:(1) Department of Computing, Imperial College, SW7 2AZ London, England
Abstract:One of the fundamental properties inclassical equational reasoning isLeibniz's principle of substitution. Unfortunately, this propertydoes not hold instandard epistemic logic. Furthermore,Herbrand's lifting theorem which isessential to thecompleteness ofresolution andParamodulation in theclassical first order logic (FOL), turns out to be invalid in standard epistemic logic. In particular, unlike classical logic, there is no skolemization normal form for standard epistemic logic. To solve these problems, we introduce anintensional epistemic logic, based on avariation of Kripke's possible-worlds semantics that need not have a constant domain. We show how a weaker notion of substitution through indexed terms can retain the Herbrand theorem. We prove how the logic can yield a satisfibility preserving skolemization form. In particular, we present an intensional principle for unifing indexed terms. Finally, we describe asound andcomplete inference system for a Horn subset of the logic withequality, based onepistemic SLD-resolution.
Keywords:Leibniz's Substitution Principle  Intension and Extension  Non-classical Logic Programming  Quantified Epistemic logic  Variable Domain Possible-worlds semantics  Skolemization Theorem for Modal logic  Horn Theories  Equational Programs  Paramodulation  SLD-Resolution and Many-sorted Unification
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