Self-defence and Forcing the Choice between Lives |
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Authors: | SEUMAS MILLER |
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Affiliation: | Seumas Miller, Philosophy Department, Rhodes University, Grahamstown 6140, South Africa and Centre for Philosophy and Public Issues, Melbourne University, Parkville, Victoria 3052, Australia. |
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Abstract: | ABSTRACT In the standard case of justifiable killing in self-defence one agent without provocation tries to kill a second agent and the second agent's only way to avoid death is to kill his attacker. It is widely accepted that such killings in self-defence are morally justifiable, but it has proved difficult to show why this is so. Recently, Montague has put forward an account in terms of forcing a choice between lives, and Teichman has propounded a quasi-Hobbesian rights-based account of self-defence. I argue that neither Montague nor Teichman has succeeded in providing an adequate justification for killing in self-defence. |
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