Blocking Definitions of Materialism |
| |
Authors: | Hawthorne JP |
| |
Institution: | (1) Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, USA |
| |
Abstract: | It is often thought that materialism about themind can be clarified using the concept of supervenience. But there is a difficulty. Amaterialist should admit the possibility ofghosts and thus should allow that a world mightduplicate the physical character of our worldand enjoy, in addition, immaterial beings withmental properties. So materialists can't claimthat every world that is physicallyindistinguishable from our world is alsomentally indistinguishable; and this is wellknown. What is less understood are thedifferent ways that immaterial add-ons can maketrouble for supervenience-theoreticformulations of materialism. In this paper, Ishall present a problematic kind of add-on thathas been ignored and look at threesupervenience-theoretic attempts to formulatematerialism in that light. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|