In Defense of Sensitivity |
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Authors: | Tim Black Peter Murphy |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, California State University, Northridge, CA, USA;(2) Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA |
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Abstract: | The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties
for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed
to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition.
Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests
a further revision that avoids our objections as well as others. The payoff is considerable: along the way to our revision,
we learn lessons about the epistemic significance of certain explanatory relations, about how we ought to envisage epistemic
closure principles, and about the epistemic significance of methods of belief formation. |
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