Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization |
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Authors: | Brian P McLaughlin |
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Institution: | (1) Philosophy Department, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA |
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Abstract: | Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes
within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing
the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties
that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including analytical
filler-functionalism for mental properties, and the assumption that causes must be proportional to their effects. I conclude
by pointing out that Shoemaker has provided no explanation of why, on his view, certain physical properties entail mental
properties.
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