A computer simulation of the argument from disagreement |
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Authors: | Johan E Gustafsson Martin Peterson |
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Institution: | (1) Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands;(2) Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium |
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Abstract: | In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According
to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced
by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for
some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we
would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external
political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased
reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates
what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds
on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006). |
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