Intention and Coercion

ABSTRACT Typically, philosophers have taken an external approach to the problem of defining 'dispositional coercion'. However, a description of the surrounding circumstances of an allegedly coercive action is not the correct approach. What is required is an account of 'dispositional coercion' primarily in terms of personal motivation. 'Dispositional coercion' involves an agent threatening someone with a sanction if the latter fails to act as the agent requests. In order to define 'dispositional coercion,' I believe, the intentions of both the coercer and the victim need elucidation. In this essay, I defend the following set of necessary and sufficient conditions for defining this concept (where X is the coercer, Y is the victim and A is the action that Y is coerced into performing).
(1) X threatens Y , that is, X intentionally attempts to create the belief in Y that X will be responsible for harm coming to Y should Y fail to do A. X's motive for attempting to create this belief is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y 's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A.
(2) X successfully creates the belief in Y that Y may be harmed if he fails to do A , that is, X is successful in causing Y to recognise that harm may come to him should he fail to do A.
(3) Y intends to do A , and Y 's motive for intending to do A is Y 's desire to avoid harm to himself.
(4) Y does A.