Remembering (Short-Term) Memory: Oscillations of an Epistemic Thing |
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Authors: | Uljana Feest |
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Institution: | (1) Institut f?r Philosophie, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte, Technische Universit?t Berlin, Stra?e des 17. Juni 135, Sekr. H72, 10623 Berlin, Germany |
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Abstract: | This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-J?rg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose
some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger
is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts
of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented
with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours
are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration
of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological)
categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science. |
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