Indirect perceptual realism and demonstratives |
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Authors: | Derek Henry Brown |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Brandon University, Brandon, MB, Canada, R7A 6A9 |
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Abstract: | I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
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Keywords: | Perception Indirect realism Demonstratives Indirect perception Misconceptions |
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