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Hard incompatibilism and its rivals
Authors:Derk Pereboom
Affiliation:(1) Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
Abstract:In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision.
Contact Information Derk PereboomEmail:
Keywords:Free will  Moral responsibility  Frankfurt-style case  Reasons-responsiveness
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