Hard incompatibilism and its rivals |
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Authors: | Derk Pereboom |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA |
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Abstract: | In this article I develop several responses to my co-authors of Four Views on Free Will. In reply to Manuel Vargas, I suggest a way to clarify his claim that our concepts of free will and moral responsibility should be revised, and I question whether he really proposes to revise the notion of basic desert at stake in the debate. In response to Robert Kane, I examine the role the rejection of Frankfurt-style arguments has in his position, and whether his criticism of my version of this argument is sound. In reply to John Fischer, I argue that the reasons-responsiveness central to his account of moral responsibility is not best characterized counterfactually, and I provide a suggestion for revision. |
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Keywords: | Free will Moral responsibility Frankfurt-style case Reasons-responsiveness |
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