| Abstract: | I argue that the separation of conjoined twins in infancy or early childhood is unethical (rare exceptions aside). Cases may be divided into three types: both twins suffer from lethal abnormalities, only one twin has a lethal abnormality, or neither twin does. In the first kind of case, there is no reason to separate, since both twins will die regardless of treatment. In the third kind of case, I argue that separation at an early age is unethical because the twins are likely to achieve an irreplaceably good quality of life—the goods of conjoinment—that separation takes away. Evaluation of this possibility requires maturation past early childhood. Regarding the second type, I point out that with conceivable but unrecorded exceptions, these cases will consistently involve sacrifice separation. I present an argument that sacrifice separation is unethical, but in some cases a moral dilemma may exist in which separation and refraining from separation are both unethical. Perhaps in such cases a decision can be made on non-moral grounds; however, the possibility of such a decision serves not to mitigate but to underscore the fact that the separation is unethical. My conclusion, which applies to all three types of cases, is that it is unethical to separate conjoined twins before their developing personalities give some reliable indication as to whether they desire separation and whether they will achieve those goods of conjoinment. |
