Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument |
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| Institution: | 1. Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland;2. Center for Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus C, Denmark;1. Oral and Maxillofacial Radiology, Applied Oral Sciences and Community Dental Care, Faculty of Dentistry, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong;2. Department of Psychology, UCLA, United States;3. Department of Applied Psychology, Lingnan University, Hong Kong;4. Wofoo Joseph Lee Consulting and Counselling Psychology Research Centre, Lingnan University, Hong Kong;1. School of Psychological Sciences, Faculty of Biomedical and Psychological Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia;2. Monash Institute of Cognitive and Clinical Neurosciences, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC 3800, Australia;3. Department of Cognitive Neurology, University Medicine Goettingen, Robert-Koch-Strasse 40, 37075 Goettingen, Germany;4. German Primate Center, Leibniz Institute for Primate Research, Kellnerweg 4, 37077 Goettingen, Germany;5. German Research Foundation (DFG) Center for Nanoscale Microscopy and Molecular Physiology of the Brain (CNMPB), Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, 37073 Goettingen, Germany;6. Laboratory for Multimodal Neuroimaging (LMN), Department of Psychiatry, University of Marburg, 35039 Marburg, Germany;7. Brain and Cognition, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam Brain and Cognition (ABC), The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness (“unfolding argument”). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness. |
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| Keywords: | Theories of consciousness Causal structure Integrated Information Theory Recurrent Processing Theory |
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