Distal engagement: Intentions in perception |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Materials Science and Engineering, Bengal Engineering and Science University, Shibpur, Howrah 711103, India;2. School of Civil, Environmental and Mining Engineering, Engineering North N136, North Terrace Campus, The University of Adelaide, SA 5005 Australia;3. Department of Aerospace and Applied Mechanics, Bengal Engineering and Science University, Shibpur, Howrah 711103, India;1. College of Contemporary Psychology, Rikkyo University, Saitama, Japan;2. Division of Cognitive Psychology, Kumamoto University, Kumamoto, Japan;1. School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Beijing Key Laboratory of Behavior and Mental Health, Peking University, Beijing, China;2. The National Clinical Research Center for Mental Disorders & Beijing Key Laboratory of Mental Disorders, Beijing Anding Hospital, Capital Medical University, Beijing, China;3. Advanced Innovation Center for Human Brain Protection, Capital Medical University, Beijing, China;4. Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, Whitewater, WI, USA;1. PSA Research Group, Palaiseau, France;2. Department of Botany, Federal University of Pelotas, Pelotas, Brazil |
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| Abstract: | Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use. |
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| Keywords: | Intentions Ecological-enactivism Perception Enactivism Ecological psychology |
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