Threats,Bluffs, and Disclaimers in Negotiations

In a buyer-seller simulation within two negotiation periods, we examined the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of variations in the communication of threats. Specifically, we examined the consequences of receiving no threat or a threat stated with, versus without, a disclaimer. In addition, we examined changes in subjects′ evaluations of their partner and negotiation outcomes after some were led to believe their partner had stated a false threat (a "bluff"). As expected, we found that while negotiators who used threats were perceived as more powerful, they were also perceived as less cooperative and achieved less integrative agreements than those who did not use threats. In addition, when information (allegedly from a constituent) identified the threat as a bluff, we found that the disclaimer lessened the negativity of re-evaluations of the negotiation partner. Taken together, our findings suggest that current theory regarding the effect of threats and bluffs in negotiation needs to be qualified by how these tactics are stated. Theoretical and practical implications of our findings are discussed.