Review

Summary Whatever conception of moral philosophy one subscribes to, it is of interest from every standpoint to determine whether and to what extent even exclusively self-interested individuals are prepared to constrain themselves in a way which can be considered moral. Since self-interest is de facto a very strong motive in decisions and behavior, such analyses are significant in two respects. First, they can show how and within which bounds a moral disposition is justifiable even when lacking, e.g., benevolence, a special moral sense, a sense of (objective) value, or any disposition to construct a veil of ignorance, viz. in order to compute an average social utility. In this regard, a kind of minimal morality can be founded on just the assumption that individuals are strictly self-interested, as N. Hoerster (1983) has shown. Secondly such analyses can sharpen one's eyes for those situations in which moral obligations are possibly incurred (and which perhaps even rational egoists may desire), but which cannot really guide behavior in the face of strong self-interest. In this regard, insight into strategies for avoiding or ameliorating problematic situations may be won.