Virtue and Disagreement |
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Authors: | Bridget Clarke |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59812, USA |
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Abstract: | One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive—and
compelling—account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle’s ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics
have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance
of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closely,
first elucidating the features of the Aristotelian account that motivate it, and then identifying two further features of
the account that the criticism overlooks. These further features show the criticism to be entirely unwarranted. Once these
features are acknowledged, a more promising line of criticism suggests itself—namely, that the Aristotelian account does too
little to help us to resolve disputes—but that line of objection will have to be carried out on quite different grounds. |
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