Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘He's got his father's bias’: Parental influence on weight bias in young children

Our aim was to explore the role of parents in the transmission of stereotypical body size attitudes and awareness of weight loss strategies to preschool children. Participants were 279 3‐year‐old children and their parents, who provided data at baseline and 1 year later. Parents completed self‐report body size attitude and dieting measures. Child weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies were assessed through interview. Over time, negative associations with large bodies and awareness of weight loss strategies increased. Fathers’ attitudes prospectively predicted boys’ weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies. Among girls, parental attitudes were less predictive. Findings confirm the importance of fathers in the development of boys’ body attitudes and inform prevention programmes.     

A cost-benefit analysis of demand for food.

Laboratory studies of consumer demand theory require assumptions regarding the definition of price in the absence of a medium of exchange (money). In this study we test the proposition that the fundamental dimension of price is a cost-benefit ratio expressed as the effort expended per unit of food value consumed. Using rats as subjects, we tested the generality of this "unit price" concept by varying four dimensions of price: fixed-ratio schedule, number of food pellets per fixed-ratio completion, probability of reinforcement, and response lever weight or effort. Two levels of the last three factors were combined in a 2 x 2 x 2 design giving eight groups. Each group was studied under a series of six FR schedules. Using the nominal values of all factors to determine unit price, we found that grams of food consumed plotted as a function of unit price followed a single demand curve. Similarly, total work output (responses x effort) conformed to a single function when plotted in terms of unit price. These observations provided a template for interpreting the effects of biological factors, such as brain lesions or drugs, that might alter the cost-benefit ratio.     

Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Assessing the relationship of Type A beliefs to cardiovascular disease risk and psychosocial distress

Investigators have begun to take a multimodal approach to the assessment and treatment of psychosocial risk factors for cardiovascular disease (CVD). For instance, cognitive responses have become the focus of contemporary research along with continued examination of overt Type A behaviors. Price (1982) has outlined a set of beliefs purportedly associated with Type A behavior and subsequent CVD risk. The current study examines the validity of this belief set as represented by a newly developed measure, the Type A Cognitive Questionnaire (TACQ). Subjects were 221 employed adults participating in a worksite CVD risk reduction program. They completed the TACQ as part of a pretreatment CVD risk screening protocol. As hypothesized, TACQ scores were significantly associated with Type A behavior, hostility, physiological mediators of CVD, and psychosocial distress. Discussion addresses continued refinement of the Type A belief construct.     

The Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire: A revised measure of alcohol-related beliefs

Alcohol-related expectancies have been recently proposed as potentially important determinants of drinking behavior. This study describes the development of a New Zealand measure of such beliefs, the Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire (DEQ). Items selected through interviews, literature review, and the modification of other relevant questionnaires were piloted on 333 drinkers in a community sample and 275 college students. Factor analyses of both samples revealed nine alcohol reinforcement domains relating to assertiveness, affective change, sexual enhancement, social enhancement, relaxation, cognitive impairment, dependence, carelessness, and aggression. The potential clinical and research possibilities using this revised expectancy measure are briefly discussed, along with the scale's strength and weaknesses.The financial assistance of the Alcoholic Liquor Advisory Council of New Zealand in conducting this study is gratefully acknowledged.     

Effects of relative reinforcer frequency on complex color detection

Pigeons were trained under a discrete-trials detection procedure in which one of a set of color stimuli was presented on the center key and a single response turned off the stimulus and illuminated two side keys. Single responses to one or the other side key produced occasional reinforcers depending on the value of the color stimulus. In Experiment 1, one color-stimulus set comprised 559, 564, 569, and 574 nm, and right-key pecks were occasionally reinforced following presentations of members of this set. The other stimulus set comprised 579, 584, 589, and 594 nm, and left-key pecks were occasionally reinforced following presentations of members of this set. Across seven experimental conditions, the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was varied from .1 to .9. In Experiment 2, one stimulus set contained only one member, 574 nm, and right-key responses were occasionally reinforced following its presentation. Over 12 experimental conditions, two manipulations were carried out. First, the number of stimuli comprising the other stimulus set was increased from one (579 nm) to two (579 and 584 nm) to three (579, 584, and 589 nm) and to four (579, 584, 589, and 594 nm), and left-key responses were reinforced occasionally following center-key presentations of members of this set. Second, for each stimulus combination, the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was varied from .1 to .5 to .9 across three experimental conditions. The principal finding of Experiments 1 and 2 was that reinforcers and stimuli interacted in their effects on behavior. In Experiment 3, pairs of adjacent stimuli (5 nm apart) in the range 559 to 594 nm were presented in each experimental condition, and the left/(left + right) relative reinforcer frequency was held constant at .5. The data from all three experiments were analyzed according to a detection model describing performance in multiple-stimulus two-response procedures. This model provided independent measures of stimulus discriminability, contingency discriminability, and bias. The analysis showed that (a) consistent with the color-naming function, pigeons were better able to discriminate between higher nanometer values than lower nanometer values; (b) their ability to discriminate between the stimuli was independent of the number of wavelengths comprising each stimulus set; (c) they allocated delivered reinforcers very accurately to the previously emitted response; and (d) no consistent biases emerged.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

The interaction of stimulus and reinforcer control in complex temporal discrimination.

Six pigeons were trained in a discrete-trials signal-detection procedure to discriminate between a fixed-duration stimulus (5 s or 20 s) and a set of variable durations ranging from 2.5 s to 57.5 s in steps of 5 s. For each fixed-duration stimulus, the ratio of reinforcer frequencies contingent upon reporting the fixed versus the variable stimulus was systematically manipulated. Detection performance was well controlled by both the stimulus value and the reinforcer ratio. Both the discriminability between the fixed duration and the set of variable durations, and the discriminability between the fixed duration and each of the variable durations, were independent of the reinforcer-frequency ratio when discriminability was measured as log d. The sensitivity of response bias to reinforcement-ratio changes was independent of the value of the fixed duration, but was not independent of the discriminability of the variable durations from the fixed durations. Under current models, discriminability measures in complex temporal discrimination may be independent of biasing manipulations, but bias measures are not independent of stimulus values.     

Self-selection biases in correlational studies based on questionnaires

It is commonly held that even where questionnaire response is poor, correlational studies are affected only by loss of degrees of freedom or precision. We show that this supposition is not true. If the decision to respond is correlated with a substantive variable of interest, then regression or analysis of variance methods based upon the questionnaire results may be adversely affected by self-selection bias. Moreover such bias may arise even where response is 100%. The problem in both cases arises where selection information is passed to the score indirectly via the disturbance or individual effects, rather than entirely via the observable explanatory variables. We suggest tests for the ensuing self-selection bias and possible ways of handling the ensuing problems of inference.The author would like to thank members of the Psychology Department at UWA for references on the illustrative example, namely the effects of sex-stereotyping on achievements in mathematics; thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers whose comments resulted in material improvements to the paper.