Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inter-individual differences in intra-individual variability in personality within and across contexts

This study focuses on intra-individual variability in personality at work, and how it relates to job performance. 288 professionals completed contextualised adjective-based personality assessments in work and non-work contexts, and a non-contextualised personality measure. Ratings of their personality were also obtained from colleagues, family members and friends. Supervisors provided performance ratings for 130 participants. Results indicate that personality is context- and source-dependent, and varies systematically within contexts intra-individually regardless of source. Whilst this variability was predictive of some performance criteria when based on other-ratings, overall predictive effects were small in number and size. This study adds to the relatively small body of research on personality variability and performance and contributes to the conceptualisation of personality as a dynamic construct.     

Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) computer-generated diagnoses: How do they compare to clinician judgment?

During the past several decades, computers have achieved increasing prominence in psychological assessment procedures. This is particularly true for computer-based test interpretation and diagnosis. This study reports on a study designed to compare the accuracy of computer-based diagnoses with clinician-generated diagnoses. The Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) was administered to 151 consecutively admitted inpatients at a large private psychiatric hospital. The computer-generated diagnoses were compared with those generated by admitting psychiatrists. The results indicated that the MCMI diagnostic impressions underestimated the severity of depressive disorders when compared with clinician diagnoses on Axis I. Specifically, clinicians diagnosed major depression much more frequently than did the MCMI. In addition, clinicians diagnosed anxiety disorders much less frequently than did the MCMI.     

The operant conditioning of response variability: Free-operant versus discrete-response procedures

The operant conditioning of response variability under free-operant and discrete-response procedures was investigated. Two pigeons received food only if their pattern of four pecks on two response keys differed from the patterns emitted on the two immediately preceding trials. Under the free-operant procedure, the keys remained illuminated and operative throughout each trial. There was little variability in the response patterns that resulted, and the pigeons received fewer than one third of the available reinforcers. Under the discrete-response procedure, a brief timeout period followed each response. Variability increased under this procedure, and the pigeons obtained three fourths of the available reinforcers. Previous successes and failures to produce response variability may have been due to the use or failure to use, respectively, a discrete-response procedure. Respondent effects inherent in the free-operant procedure may encourage the development of response stereotypy and, in turn, prevent the development of response variability.     

How infant-directed actions enhance infants’ attention,learning, and exploration: Evidence from EEG and computational modeling

When teaching infants new actions, parents tend to modify their movements. Infants prefer these infant-directed actions (IDAs) over adult-directed actions and learn well from them. Yet, it remains unclear how parents’ action modulations capture infants’ attention. Typically, making movements larger than usual is thought to draw attention. Recent findings, however, suggest that parents might exploit movement variability to highlight actions. We hypothesized that variability in movement amplitude rather than higher amplitude is capturing infants’ attention during IDAs. Using EEG, we measured 15-month-olds’ brain activity while they were observing action demonstrations with normal, high, or variable amplitude movements. Infants’ theta power (4–5 Hz) in fronto-central channels was compared between conditions. Frontal theta was significantly higher, indicating stronger attentional engagement, in the variable compared to the other conditions. Computational modelling showed that infants’ frontal theta power was predicted best by how surprising each movement was. Thus, surprise induced by variability in movements rather than large movements alone engages infants’ attention during IDAs. Infants with higher theta power for variable movements were more likely to perform actions successfully and to explore objects novel in the context of the given goal. This highlights the brain mechanisms by which IDAs enhance infants’ attention, learning, and exploration.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.     

Reflections on segregating and assessing areas of competence

Various complexities that arise in the application of legal and/or clinical criteria to the actual assessment of competence/capacity are discussed, and a particular way of understanding the nature of such criteria is recommended.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both

In a recent issue of this journal, Winman and Juslin (34 , 135–148, 1993) present a model of the calibration of subjective probability judgments for sensory discrimination tasks. They claim that the model predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias observed in such tasks, and present evidence from a training experiment that they interpret as supporting the notion that different models are needed to describe judgment of confidence in sensory and in cognitive tasks. The model is actually part of the more comprehensive decision variable partition model of subjective probability calibration that was originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26 , 32–53, 1980). The characteristics of the model are described and it is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies. It is concluded that only a single model is needed for both types of task.