KILLING, SELF-DEFENSE, AND BAD LUCK

This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involuntary harm or threat. The theory is meant to capture our intuitions both about instances in which we can draw a moral asymmetry between attacker and victim and cases in which we cannot. I develop the theory by attending to instances of intentional, villainous harm and instances of involuntary danger—the latter of which are a matter of bad luck. I call some bad luck cases "Interpersonal Lottery Conflicts." These cases refer to potentially lethal conflicts into which parties are thrown as victims of circumstance. Although neither party has a moral advantage over another, that fact does not preclude permissible self-defense.     

Therapist memory and reverie: implications for the clinical setting

In this work, the author considers reveries to be ‘dream-like-memories’. In the course of a session they appear as proto-memory – the therapist’s early traumatic object relations that are recorded in the unconscious at an almost bodily level (a type of unthought known) and which are resurrected between therapist and patient when a similar traumatic subject arises between them. The therapist’s reveries are recollections in the form of dream-like allusions to his past experience. A clinical vignette from the psychotherapy of a child whose father suffered from PTSD (following a wartime experience in Afghanistan and Iraq) is discussed. Dissociative dynamics were repeated in the therapeutic relationship, in the form of an obsessive game intending to preserve the state in which there was no need to remember what had been unconsciously transmitted to the child: his father’s wartime experience. The projection of the primary elements which had been silenced evoked in the therapist allusions to his unconscious identification with his ancestor’s post-traumatic experiences. These allusions helped in overcoming the dissociated state. The role of memory in child psychotherapists’ receptivity of trauma is revisited.     

The Ethics of Killing in War

This paper argues that certain central tenets of the traditional theory of the just war cannot be correct. It then advances an alternative account grounded in the same considerations of justice that govern self-defense at the individual level. The implications of this account are unorthodox. It implies that, with few exceptions, combatants who fight for an unjust cause act impermissibly when they attack enemy combatants, and that combatants who fight in a just war may, in certain circumstances, legitimately target noncombatants who bear a significant degree of moral responsibility for a wrong, when the prevention or rectification of that wrong constitutes a just cause for war.

Raising Revenue for Persons with Disabilities

Whereas right-libertarians do not think that it is a requirement of justice that we raise revenues for persons with disabilities, both left-libertarians and liberal egalitarians think that there is such a requirement. An issue remains for the latter two theorists—how ought we to raise this revenue? Liberal egalitarians typically endorse either universal taxation or taxation of the wealthy. Left-libertarians, on the other hand, cannot so easily appeal to the methods of universal taxation and taxation of the wealthy, as they are illegitimately coercive. One such method left open to the left-libertarian is one proposed by Michael Otsuka. He argues that both left-libertarians and liberal egalitarians should find the method of taxation of the unjust to be a reasonably strong way of raising revenue. In this paper, I point out problems with Otsuka’s argument, as well as directly criticize the method of taxation of the unjust.     

From Consumerism to Stewardship: The Troublesome Ambiguities of an Attractive Option1

Abstract : Problems with consumerism may lead Christians to project the idea of responsible stewardship as an alternative. But this would be highly problematic. Although a part of many American Christians’ experience, and apparently bolstered by the authority of Jesus himself, the construct resists normative theological definition. It is too closely allied in our culture with “the spirit of capitalism” and tends to re‐enforce secular understandings of private property. The construct stewardship, therefore, should be used sparingly, if at all, in church circles.     

无辜受害事件对公正世界信念的威胁:观察者的角色偏倚

无辜受害者信息往往打破民众“好人有好报”的公正世界,而这种公正世界信念的威胁也因人而异。通过情绪Stroop效应验证这一心理现象,并探讨观察者与无辜受害者的群体归属以及观察者的不公正体验是否会影响公正世界信念威胁的程度。结果表明:(1)无论观察者是否与无辜受害者属于同一群体,或者观察者有无不公正体验,无辜受害者信息均会激活观察者的公正世界信念。(2)相比于外群体,当观察者与受害者属于同一群体类型(内群体)时,其公正世界信念的激活程度更强。(3)内群体观察者在有和无不公正体验的条件下,公正世界信念的威胁程度不存在显著差异。