The identity of Brexit: A cultural psychology analysis

In this paper, we propose a culturalist interpretation of the outcome of the Brexit referendum. This interpretation is grounded on the analysis of the U.K.'s cultural milieu, which is part of a more general study of the cultural milieus of several European countries. Specific to the United Kingdom, our analysis is based on a questionnaire carried out on a representative sample of U.K. respondents stratified by sociodemographic variables and geographic region (NUTS1). Responses to the questionnaire were subjected to multidimensional analysis—a combination of multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis. Findings about the multicountry analysis show how cultural milieus are characterized by five basic, embodied, affect‐laden, generalized worldviews (defined as “Symbolic Universes”). Four out of five symbolic universes consist of a way of interpreting reality by a specific anchorage (i.e., the ethical norm, the institutional order, the emotional experience interpersonal bond, and the belongingness). One symbolic universe can be viewed as the anomic reaction to the failure of those anchorages. Focusing on Brexit, by means of a discriminant analysis, it is showed how the incidence of the symbolic universes (and of the underpinning basic dimensions of meaning within the 12 U.K. macroregions') enables to identify differentially the macroregions with high proportion of “leave” at the Brexit referendum against those with low proportion. More specifically, the high “leave” macroregion are characterized by higher relevance of cultural forms anchored on local identity/belongingness. Findings are discussed within the wider aims of the project and its implications for a cultural psychology informed policymaking.     

Universes of Fuzzy Sets and Axiomatizations of Fuzzy Set Theory. Part I: Model-Based and Axiomatic Approaches

For classical sets one has with the cumulative hierarchy of sets, with axiomatizations like the system ZF, and with the category SET of all sets and mappings standard approaches toward global universes of all sets. We discuss here the corresponding situation for fuzzy set theory.Our emphasis will be on various approaches toward (more or less naively formed)universes of fuzzy sets as well as on axiomatizations, and on categories of fuzzy sets. What we give is a (critical)survey of quite a lot of such approaches which have been offered in the last approximately 35 years. The present Part I is devoted to model based and to axiomatic approaches; the forth-coming Part II will be devoted to category theoretic approaches. This paper is a version of the invited talk given by the author at the conference Trends in Logic III, dedicated to the memory of A. MOSTOWSKI, H. RASIOWA and C. RAUSZER, and held in Warsaw and Ruciane-Nida from 23rd to 25th September 2005. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Is Theism a Simple,and hence Probable,Explanation for the Universe?

Abstract

Richard Swinburne, in his The Existence of God (2004), presents a cosmological argument in defence of theism (Swinburne 1991: 119, 135). God, Swinburne argues, is more likely to bring about an ordered universe than other states (ibid.: 144, 299). To defend this view, Swinburne presents the following arguments: (1) That this ordered universe is a priori improbable (2004: 49, 150, 1991: 304 et seq.), given the stringent requirements for life (cf. also Leslie 2000: 12), and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Giancoli 1990: 396); (2) That it seems as if this ordered universe can be explained by theism; (3) A theistic explanation for the universe is more probable because it is a simple explanation. To this end, Swinburne makes use of Bayes’ Theorem. Symbolically, this claim can be represented as (e) for the evidence of the existence of a complex universe, and (h) for a hypothesis. Swinburne’s argument is that theism has a higher prior probability, P(h_theism) > P(h_materialism), since theism is simpler than materialism. He concludes that P(e|h_theism) > P(e|h_materialism). In this paper I will address only this argument (3) above, and defend the view that it is false: theism is not simpler than materialism, nor it is more probably true. I conclude that theism is less probable than materialism, expressed by P(h_theism) < P(h_materialism) : 2/N(2n+1) < 1/n, where N is the number of possible universes and n the number of entities in existence.     

Universes of Fuzzy Sets and Axiomatizations of Fuzzy Set Theory. Part II: Category Theoretic Approaches

For classical sets one has with the cumulative hierarchy of sets, with axiomatizations like the system ZF, and with the category SET of all sets and mappings standard approaches toward global universes of all sets.We discuss here the corresponding situation for fuzzy set theory. Our emphasis will be on various approaches toward (more or less naively formed) universes of fuzzy sets as well as on axiomatizations, and on categories of fuzzy sets.What we give is a (critical) survey of quite a lot of such approaches which have been offered in the last approximately 35 years.Part I was devoted to model based and to axiomatic approaches; the present Part II is devoted to category theoretic approaches.This paper is a version of the invited talk given by the author at the conference Trends in Logic III, dedicated to the memory of A. MOSTOWSKI, H. RASIOWA and C. RAUSZER, and held in Warsaw and Ruciane-Nida from 23rd to 25th September 2005.     

Cosmology: What One Needs to Know

Cosmology, the study of the universe, has a past, which is reviewed here. The standard model—the Big Bang, or the hot, dense early universe that is still expanding—is based on observations that are basically consistent but which require additional input to improve the agreement. Out of the early universe came the galaxies and stars that shine today. The future of the universe depends on the density of matter: too much mass leads to the Big Crunch; too little leads to eternal expans ion and cooling. The dark-matter problem prevents us from knowing which will be the fate of the universe. Thelimits of what may be called "scientific" are addressed.     

Truth in Applicative Theories

We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID₁ in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.