Strengthening Biblical Historicity vis-à-vis Minimalism, 1992–2008 and Beyond,Part 2.2: The Literature of Perspective,Critique, and Methodology,Second Half

This series of articles covers scholarly works in English which can, at least potentially, be associated with a generally positive view of biblical historicity regarding periods preceding the Israelites’ return from exile. Part 2 covers works that treat the methodological issues at the center of the maximalist–minimalist debate. Parts 3–5 will cover works on evidences.

This article completes the coverage, begun in the preceding article, of works that are neither maximalist nor minimalist, by treating select publications of Anthony J. Frendo, Nadav Na’aman, Israel Finkelstein, Andrew G. Vaughn, Baruch Halpern, Robert D. Miller II, and H. G. M. Williamson.

It then discusses works on methodology by authors who espouse biblical historicity unless it is proven wrong, who are often called maximalists. It introduces these through the comments of Craig G. Bartholomew, then treats select works by Kenneth A. Kitchen, Jens Bruun Kofoed, Richard E. Averbeck, Iain W. Provan, V. Philips Long, and James K. Hoffmeier.     

Change,Difference, and Orthodox Truthmaker Theory

Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two times, t₁ and t₂, such that everything that exists at t₂ also exists at t₁, but some things that exist at t₁ do not exist at t₂ Temporal Change. Call the thesis that, possibly, there are two worlds, w and v, such that everything that exists at v also exists at w, but some things that exist at w do not exist at v Modal Difference. I argue that if either Temporal Change or Modal Difference is true, then Orthodox Truthmaker Theory—the theory that every truth requires a necessitating truthmaker—is false.     

Making semantics for essence

In this paper, I develop a truthmaker semantics for essence and use the semantics to investigate the explanatory role of essence.     

The cost of truthmaker maximalism

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.