A revised list of Spanish translations of operant terminology

The experimental analysis of behavior has grown enormously in Latin America within the last decade. This paper offers an updating revision of suggested Spanish translations of operant expressions.     

A Functional Analysis of Psychological Terms Redux

In his seminal paper, “An Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,” Skinner (1945) offered the revolutionary suggestion that, rather than endlessly debating the meanings of psychological terms, psychologists should analyze the variables that control their occurrence as verbal behavior. Skinner''s suggestion reflected the essence of his 1957 book, Verbal Behavior, wherein he argued that the behaviors of which language is composed (i.e., speaking and listening) are controlled by variables found in the social environment (which he called the verbal community), and that analyzing those variables would lead to an understanding of the behaviors. Although Skinner formally introduced his radical approach to language in 1945, it has yet to be fully realized. The result is that psychologists, including behavior analysts, still debate the definitions of terms. In the present paper, I review Skinner''s functional approach to language and describe ways in which behavior analysts have already applied it to traditional psychological terms. I conclude by looking at other current terms in behavior analysis that engender some confusion and encourage behavior analysts to apply a functional analytic approach to their own verbal behavior.     

宗教对信徒颜色认知的影响及作用机制:以中国台湾宗教信徒为例

采用自然分类法考察中国台湾佛教徒、道教徒、基督徒和非宗教信徒的基本颜色词分类,并做多维标度和聚类分析,以揭示宗教对信徒颜色认知的影响。结果发现,中国台湾三大宗教信徒对基本颜色词的分类既具有共性,又存在差异,宗教信徒与非宗教信徒的基本颜色词分类也存在着共性和差异,共性反映了汉语言和汉文化的影响,差异反映了宗教对颜色认知的影响。研究表明,颜色通过意象式传播方式影响信徒的颜色认知,支持颜色词与颜色认知的相互作用理论。     

颜色词与颜色认知的关系——基于民族心理学的研究视角

颜色词与颜色认知的关系是语言影响认知的重要领域.不同民族之间存在着语言和文化的差异.对于颜色词与颜色认知的关系,一直就存在着普遍进化理论和语言相对论的争论.既往研究通过哲学思辨、命名和计算、颜色分类、颜色记忆和颜色搜索等多种范式对颜色词与颜色认知的关系进行了卓有成效的探讨,使该领域的研究呈现出蓬勃发展的局面.     

The over-generalization problem: predicates rigidly signifying the “unnatural”

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as ‘is a knife,’ ‘is a bachelor,’ or ‘is funny.’ In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that “unnatural” properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded.     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

论心理学术语翻译的标准化

心理学专业术语翻译的标准化,是心理学史和理论心理学所面临的重要课题。它对于我们心理学的研究与发展,对于心理学的国际间交流,都有着重要的意义。标准化是科学化的前提,也是学科成熟,或学科现代化的标志。作者对此提出了自己的思考和意见,以便引起关注和讨论。     

When Cheap Isn't the Same as Not Expensive: Generic Price Terms and Their Negations

Generic price terms such as cheap, not expensive, not cheap, and expensive are used frequently in marketing, but little is known about how consumers interpret them. In typical consumer contexts, in which lower prices are preferred, we find that not cheap means essentially the same as expensive (i.e., not cheap = expensive). In contrast, not expensive does not mean the same as cheap, in that cheap is associated with lower prices (i.e., cheap < not expensive). As an implication, in a consumer survey we find different response distributions for rating scales that are anchored with endpoint labels of not expensive versus expensive as compared to cheap versus expensive or cheap versus not cheap (the latter two are equivalent). Furthermore, although cheap is associated with lower prices than not expensive, this does not necessarily translate into higher preferences for options that are described as cheap (vs. not expensive), because cheap may also evoke negative quality perceptions. Finally, we demonstrate an interesting reversal in the way price terms are interpreted: when higher prices are preferred, cheap is equal to not expensive (i.e., cheap = not expensive), whereas not cheap is associated with lower prices than expensive (i.e., not cheap < expensive).     

Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?

According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not depends upon our values. Hence, “objective laws” cannot be read as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.