Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.     

Religiosity and Secular and Ascetic Deviance

According to the antiascetic hypothesis, religiosity should be strongly related to behaviors that violate ascetic standards (getting drunk and using marijuana), but only weakly related to behaviors that violate social standards (violence and stealing). Using the second wave of the National Study of Youth and Religion, I tested the antiascetic hypothesis using a question about the most important basis for deciding what is morally right or wrong. Contrary to the antiascetic hypothesis, individuals who believe that God's law is the most important for deciding what is morally right or wrong, compared to those who believe that society is the most important, are not less likely to get drunk or use marijuana. Furthermore, for getting drunk and marijuana use, differences in behavior are not the result of different ethical standards (ascetic or social), but rather differences in the willingness to uphold those standards (is it OK to break moral rules).     

Developing a Community Science Research Agenda for Building Community Capacity for Effective Preventive Interventions

Research has shown that prevention programming can improve community health when implemented well. There are examples of successful prevention in local communities, however many continue to face significant challenges, demonstrating a gap between science and practice. Common strategies within the United States to address this gap are available (e.g., trainings), but lack outcomes. Building community capacity to implement high quality prevention can help communities achieve positive health outcomes, thereby narrowing the gap. While there is ample research on the efficacy of evidence-based programs, there is little on how to improve community capacity to improve prevention quality. In order to narrow the gap, a new model of research—one based in Community Science—is suggested that improves the latest theoretical understanding of community capacity and evaluates technologies designed to enhance it. In this article, we describe this model and suggest a research agenda that can lead to improved outcomes at the local level.     

Shackling the shoulders of giants

This paper informally summarizes a two-day symposium held at the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C., September 5–6, 2002. The issue was to what extent the progress of science and societal capacity for continued technological innovation are threatened by excessive protection of intellectual property. Excessive protection creates disadvantages not only for scientists and inventors but also for educators/students and for librarians/clientele. Speakers from a variety of disciplines and institutions agreed unanimously that scientific and technological progress is, indeed, under serious threat. Various opinions were expressed about the degree of threat, currently and prospectively, as well as what counter-measures are best suited to resist undue restrictions on creative uses of scientific and technical data and information. This summary is based entirely on the author’s notes from the symposium, and the commentary offered is his alone. My apologies to the speakers if this paper does not accurately reflect the primary intent of their presentations. The “Suggested Readings” offered at the end are not specific to the speakers’ statements but rather are offered as a general resource to aid further research. The definitive record of the symposium is planned to be available from the National Academies Press as a Proceedings publication in the summer of 2003. John Gardenier is an independent researcher, ethicist and science writer.     

Learning from the law to address uncertainty in the precautionary principle

Environmentalists have advocated the Precautionary Principle (PP) to help guide public and private decisions about the environment. By contrast, industry and its spokesmen have opposed this. There is not one principle, but many that have been recommended for this purpose. Despite the attractiveness of a core idea in all versions of the principle—that decision-makers should take some precautionary steps to ensure that threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment and public health do not materialize into harm—even one of the most widely endorsed principles needs considerable specification and refinement before it can be used. Moreover, the PP is an approach or guide to utilizing scientific evidence in social or legal decision-making contexts. In this it does not differ in kind from other approaches to using factual information such as in the law. The law provides some models for different strategies to guide decision-making under uncertainty when factual issues cannot be resolved with certainty. These in turn can help guide the formulation of different versions of PP and help clarify some presuppositions of the principle. Once some plausible versions of PP are articulated, I suggest some applications to existing environmental problems.     

Competences and occupational standards for systemic family and couples therapy

This article reports on the recent government initiative of 2007–2010 to delineate, for the major forms of psychological therapy, expected professional standards of practice and conduct in workplaces (the national occupational standards) and to specify expected levels of competent practice (the competences). The article focuses on the processes and outcomes of this initiative for systemic therapy and its clinical and political relevance. The rationale, research and consultation processes by which these formulations were achieved are described and the outcomes of the work are reported. We also discuss their wider implications, including the various ways in which these achievements might be used and their potential value for the field of systemic family and couples therapy.