Identity, narcissism and the emotional core

This paper describes the course of an analysis which demonstrates how borderline and narcissistic functioning can be understood in terms of a struggle with issues of identity. It shows how such functioning can come to exert a profound hold on the individual and why it seems, at times, a matter of life and death to the patient to avoid states of separation from the analyst. The paper suggests that these complex phenomena can be understood, perhaps surprisingly, in the simple terms of the nature of affect itself. The concept of the emotional core is introduced to embody and highlight that which lies beneath both Jungian and Freudian models (offering a potential bridge between the two models)--namely the psyche's essentially affective nature. It is suggested that the emotional core can serve as an organ of perception giving the individual both their primary relation to reality and an emotional attachment to others. This emotional core is understood to function in a narcissistic manner to preference experiences of sameness and in aversion to experiences of difference--a view consonant with Stern's understanding of infant development where the infant is able to distinguish self from other from the beginning of life (as Fordham also held); taking up Stern's terminology, it gives the individual a 'core' sense of being. There is, however, no stable, on-going sense of 'I' associated with this form of functioning as the individual is immersed in the latest affect to enter consciousness (as in the borderline state of mind) and consequently the individual comes to rely intensely on the other to determine their sense of being (the other becomes a self-regulating other in Stern's terms). The development of ego-functioning gives a more stable and on-going sense of 'I' to the individual, giving contact with the broader personality, allowing the individual to be less reliant on the other and orientating them to reality in a way more fitting to their overall needs. The paper describes how consciousness, which is not seen as identical with the ego, moves between the mode of functioning of the ego and that of the emotional core, i.e., shifting in and out of states where projective identification predominates. It elaborates the range of self-experience encompassing spiritual experience and states of disintegration (which are understood to have a similar structure) on one side, to ego-based experience (which can itself be defensive and rigid at times) on the other. It explores the consequences of such a view for analytic technique and relates it to the Jungian view of the self and the Freudian unconscious.     

Silent dialogues in the analytic relationship

Abstract

In borderline or even narcissistic patients, the relation to the objects is built on the basis of omnipotent control, so that those patients present difficulties related to mourning for the loss, as well as for the independence, of the objects. Their basic trait is a huge inability to recognize the separateness of others, together with an excessive use of primitive defense mechanisms, such as projective identification. Each experience that contains the danger of re-experiencing the primal separation poses an attack on the analytic setting, in order to avoid such a re-experiencing. Those attacks sometimes take the known form of acting out, whereas other times they are limited to a special use of speech, which lacks any communicational faculty and is used rather as a weapon. This special climate affects the analyst, causing specific countertransferential reactions. Nowadays, we tend to consider such a communication not mostly as an obstacle, but rather as an opportunity, allowing the analyst to comprehend the patient, through his countertransference, and create a meaning to replace the void those patients usually experience. The transference and countertransference enactments, their silent dialogues taking place in the analytic setting, are those which progressively give meaning in this primitive non verbal communication.     

‘Nachträglichkeit’: The intermediary of an unassimilated impression and experience

In this paper, Freud's recommendations regarding the timing of interventions are reviewed, especially the work of pointing out and interpreting resistance-phenomena. This is compared to recent developments in psychoanalytic technique. Interventions, their timing and effect are illustrated by clinical material from three psychoanalyses. The possibility of integrating the different recommendations is discussed. An overall experience is that the most demanding work is that of making resistance-phenomena observable for both parties in the analytic situation. It is demonstrated how this precondition can be developed through the analyst's experience of the interaction, and thus give the time for intervention.     

His mother-tongue: from stuttering to separation, a case history

This paper delineates the transference and countertransference experiences in the analysis of a patient whose presenting symptom and main concern was his stutter. I suggest that oral-sadistic rather than anal-sadistic hostile elements may be identified in this patient's particular stutter. I focus on its significance in terms of object relationship: my patient's struggle to 'get born', to emerge as a separate other. I argue that early symbiotic fusion needs in conflict with the need to separate produce his stutter. Speech and language are seen as the vehicle for separation and the stutter as a flight from separateness back to an illusion of fusion with mother.     

Clinging,gripping, holding,containment: Reflections on a survival reflex and the development of a capacity to separate

This paper attempts to describe how, in the very first months of extra‐uterine life, personality structures are formed around notions of personal space, separateness, attachment and individuation. The contribution of a forgotten Hungarian analyst, Imre Hermann, who wrote about the ‘clinging reflex’, will be explored in relation to the origin of Bowlby's concept of attachment and Rey's theoretical understanding of personal space. Particular attention will be given to transitions, transitional experiences and the development of a sense of internal space. Vignettes from infant observations will be used to illustrate the theoretical frame of reference. Clinical material from the analysis of a child and an adult patient will be provided to postulate how a distorted perception of personal space and separateness in the first few months of life may affect the capacity to attach and to individuate.     

Demandingness and Boundaries Between Persons

ABSTRACT

Demandingness objections to consequentialism often claim that consequentialism underestimates the moral significance of the stranger/special other distinction, mistakenly extending to strangers demands it is proper for special others to make on us, and concluding that strangers may properly demand anything of us if it increases aggregate goodness. This argument relies on false assumptions about our relations with special others. Boundaries between ourselves and special others are both a common and a good-making feature of our relations with them. Hence, demandingness objections that rely on the argument in question fail. But the same observations about our relations with special others show that there are many demands special others may not properly make, and since we cannot be more guilty of unjustified partiality in insisting on boundaries between ourselves and strangers than on boundaries between ourselves and special others, there are – as demandingness objections maintain – some demands strangers may not properly make on us.     

Envy and difference

This paper explores five examples of envy, examining the similarities and differences between the clinical situations. The theory relating to envy is extensively reviewed and a critique of the Kleinian position is offered, suggesting that the aversion to separation and difference is not only prior to, but also has explanatory precedence over, the functioning of envy. Kleinian examples are explored in this light. The experience of separateness and difference is understood to lead to a number of outcomes: envy, admiration, competitiveness, a sense of low self-esteem and inadequacy, or a fear of being envied. It is argued that the individual's particular personality organization and their associated relational pattern will determine their experience of envy. Examples of schizoid, borderline, narcissistic and hysteric functioning in relation to envy are examined in some depth. The link between these phenomena and the death instinct is touched on.     

Alterity,Intimacy, and the Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics

This essay responds to four critics of Friends and Other Strangers: Studies in Religion, Ethics and Culture: Diana Fritz Cates, Eric Gregory, Ross Moret, and Atalia Omer. Focusing on the book’s organizing concepts of intimacy and alterity, engagement with empirical sources, discussion of Augustine’s thought, and attention to moral psychology and political morality, these interlocutors take up various strands in the book’s argument and extend them into metaethical, normative, and metadisciplinary domains. The author organizes his response under three rubrics: Metaethics and Personal Relationships; Political Morality; and Multidisciplinary Horizons.     

Relational Complexity and Ethical Responsibility

Richard Miller uses the concepts of alterity and intimacy as touchstones for analyzing neglected aspects of our interpersonal and social relationships. He argues that, as persons in relation, we oscillate between experiences of alterity and intimacy, and it is with a greater awareness of this oscillation that we do best to consider our ethical responsibilities. This paper affirms the value of thinking about—and potentially reimagining—how we conceive and relate to various others. It also makes explicit that, as persons, each of us is separate, not only from some, but from all other persons, even as we are also one with them. Moreover, each of us is different from all other persons, even as we are also like them. The aspects of persons and relationships on which we focus, in a given situation, matter because they partly determine the choices that we make in another’s regard.