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Panos Theodorou 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2004,35(1):175-200
Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there
cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds.
He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time
scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic experiences
of the world due to an interpretation of something `same' beyond the paradigms,and Kuhn rejects this. The question of whether
a common ground can be found behind two or more different paradigmatic world-views relates to many issues in philosophy of
science and in general epistemology (e.g., realism-idealism, relativism-objectivism, etc.). As a first approach to these,
in this paper I examine the presuppositions of Kuhn's claim, its consistency in the exposition, and its overall viability.
I conclude that the actual way in which Kuhn refers to the historical examples he examines undermines his explicit thesis.
But also the paradox he himself recognizes in his thought that `though the world does not change with a change of paradigm,
the scientists afterward works in a different world' can be solved only if we start to think seriously about the necessity
and nature of a `same in the different' behind the competing paradigmatic world-experiences.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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SU Dechao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2012,7(2):284
Neither logical deduction nor empirical induction is capable of mediating the dispute between religious disciples and non-disciples. The case is particularly acute when it comes to the divine Reality (God). Within Wittgenstein’s theoretical framework, some scholars start from the perspective of language games, contending that this dispute is meaningless and should be abandoned, while others are not satisfied with such a settlement and extend Wittgenstein’s aspect theory to religious issues, arguing that God is an aspect. The extension includes analogous and theoretical extensions. This article will show that even if these two extensions are successful, their interpretations with regard to the disputes between religious disciples and non-disciples are not convincing. Worse still, the extension from aspect theory to religious issues is by no means successful in proving that God is an aspect. 相似文献
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Joško Žanić 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(1):3-13
This paper claims that what philosophy primarily does is interpret our notions, offer ways of understanding these notions that are not scientific in nature but not contrary to science either. The paper draws a distinction between conceptual analysis, a highly constrained enterprise that is supposed to bring to light what was in the concept all along, and the interpretation of notions, a creative enterprise that offers ways of understanding notions that were not already prefigured by the content of these notions—philosophy consists in the latter, not the former. It explains how these interpretations are justified and what the difference is between better and worse interpretations. The remainder of the paper is organized around three headings: philosophy and science, philosophy and language, and philosophy and progress. It claims that in philosophy there is no real progress, but that philosophy does move forward because the notions at issue are endlessly interpretable. 相似文献
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