Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

整合模型还是占优启发式模型? 从齐当别模型视角进行的检验

实验从齐当别模型的视角,通过对决策过程反应时的考察分别对以累积预期理论(cumulative prospect theory)为代表的整合模型和启发式模型家族的重要成员--占优启发式模型(priority heuristic)--进行检验。结果表明,决策过程反应时并未随着占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤的增加而变慢;也未随着选项之间整体值差值的变大而变快;模糊决策过程的反应时反而快于风险决策过程的反应时。无论是以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型还是占优启发式模型均不能满意地描述和解释人们的实际决策过程,而齐当别模型则能解释大部分实验结果。文章建议多角度、多指标探讨人们的决策过程,检验、修改、完善,以及建立新的启发式模型或决策过程模型(process model),以增进对人们如何进行风险决策的理解。     

记忆源检测的双加工机制研究

本研究借鉴Mitchell等人的图词归源和早晚归源任务,引发启发式和系统式加工,并引入知觉流畅性变量,试图在知觉层面上分离两种加工的底层工作模式。结果发现:(1)源检测具有相对脆弱性,成绩显著差于再认。(2)启发式加工和系统式加工在加工速度和底层工作模式上分离,启发式加工速度快,其工作模式似乎是对刺激的知觉流畅性进行阈下水平的解释与归因,而系统式加工速度慢,其工作模式似乎是对意义的分析与推理。     

The Natural Selection of Prediction Heuristics: Anchoring and Adjustment versus Representativeness

There are several heuristics which people use in making numerical predictions and these heuristics compete for the determination of prediction output. Some of them (e.g. representativeness) lead to excessively extreme predictions while others (e.g. anchoring and adjustment) lead to regressive (and even over-regressive) predictions. In this paper we study the competition between these two heuristics by varying the representation of predictor and outcome. The results indicate that factors which facilitate reliance on representativeness (e.g. compatibility between predictor and outcome) indeed lead to an increase in extremity, while factors that facilitate reliance on anchoring and adjustment (e.g. increased salience of a potential anchor) lead to a decrease in extremity.     

The automated cockpit: A comparison of attitudes towards human and automated pilots

Automation is being used extensively in aviation, particularly in the aircrafts themselves. The airline industry benefits from automation because it often increases efficiency and performance. To date, automation research has focused largely on operator trust and reliance, while largely ignoring the role of affect and trust in shaping the attitudes of the novice consumer. In two studies, we found that participants rated a human pilot more favorably than an auto-pilot. However, attitudes toward the automated pilot were more favorable in a high priced compared to a low priced ticket condition, indicating that participants used price to infer quality. In Study 2, inducing positive affect increased ratings of an automated pilot. Path analyses provided additional evidence that perceptions of automation are largely influenced by feelings.     

Exploring the informational sources of metaperception: the case of Change Blindness Blindness

Perceivers generally show a poor ability to detect changes, a condition referred to as “Change Blindness” (CB). They are, in addition, “blind to their own blindness”. A common explanation of this “Change Blindness Blindness” (CBB) is that it derives from an inadequate, “photographical” folk-theory about perception. This explanation, however, does not account for intra-individual variations of CBB across trials. Our study aims to explore an alternative theory, according to which participants base their self-evaluations on two activity-dependent cues, namely search time and perceived success in prior trials. These cues were found to influence self-evaluation in two orthogonal ways: success-feedback influenced self-evaluation in a global, contextual way, presumably by recalibrating the norm of adequacy for the task. Search time influenced it in a local way, predicting the success of a given trial from its duration.     

Familiarity can increase stereotyping

Two experiments show that repeated exposure to information about a target person reduces individuation and thereby increases stereotyping of the target person based on social group memberships. The effect is not due to familiarity-induced liking (the mere exposure effect), nor is it mediated by increased accessibility of the target’s social category, nor by increases in perceived social judgeability. The results are most consistent with the use of feelings of familiarity as a regulator of processing mode, such that familiar objects receive less systematic or analytic processing. In everyday life, frequent exposure to another person ordinarily produces not only familiarity but also liking, individuated knowledge, and friendship, factors that may effectively limit stereotyping. But when previous exposure is unconfounded from these other factors, its effect can be to increase stereotyping.     

Researching psychotherapy integration: A heuristic approach

Moustakas argues that questions and methodology in heuristic research flow out of inner awareness, meaning and inspiration. The approach might arguably embrace a combination of qualitative research methods, and constitute a kind of bricolage. This paper describes a heuristic enquiry into psychotherapy integration that used such a combination of methods – an interpretative phenomenological approach, case studies, reflexive action, and writing. It demonstrates how each of these methods contributed to the six phases of heuristic enquiry, from the initial engagement with psychotherapy as a trainee to the creative synthesis of published works and a PhD thesis, together with some reflection on the enquiry's limitations and rigour. Published texts, training, clinical practice and reflexivity constituted the material from which a new organizing framework for understanding psychotherapy integration was formulated. The author reflects on how the research design allowed deep engagement with this material, and changed his perspective of psychotherapy integration. In conclusion, this paper suggests that both psychotherapy integration and heuristic enquiry can only be conducted on an individual and personal basis, and that it is the quality of the relationship, with the client, or the research material, that produces results.     

Blind justice: Fairness to groups and the do-no-harm principle

People are reluctant to harm some people in order to help others, even when the harm is less than the forgone help (the harm resulting from not acting). The present studies use hypothetical scenarios to argue that these judgments go against what the subjects themselves would take to be the best overall outcome. When the outcomes in question are income gains and losses for two groups of farmers, subjects judge the harm they would not impose through their action to be smaller than the harm they would impose through inaction. Some subjects refuse to reduce cure rates for one group of AIDS patients in order to increase cure rates more for another group, even when group membership was unknowable to anyone, so that, from each patient's point of view, the change would increase the probability of cure. Likewise, they resisted a vaccine that reduced overall mortality in one group but increased deaths from side effects in another group, even when, again, group membership was unknowable. Some people apply a do-no-harm principle to groups without apparent understanding of how such a principle might be justified in terms of its consequences. The capacity for such judgments makes them vulnerable to learning principles that have no justification at all.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).