Representations in dynamical embodied agents: re-analyzing a minimally cognitive model agent

Understanding the role of 'representations' in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as 'standing in,' and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.     

MAKING IT EXPLICIT AND CLEAR: FROM “STRONG” TO “HYPER‐” INFERENTIALISM IN BRANDOM AND PEIRCE

Abstract: This article explores how Robert Brandom's original “inferentialist” philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack (in “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” and other early papers) on the use of “intuition” in nineteenth‐century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating “tales of the mighty dead.” However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely “strong” inferentialism, which admits some non‐inferential mental content (although it is parasitic on the inferential and can only be “inferentially articulated”), Peirce embraces a total, that is, “hyper‐,” inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended.     

From Global Expressivism to Global Pragmatism

In the twentieth century, questions of meaning and representation played a central role in the development of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Present‐day neopragmatism, such as Huw Price's “global expressivism,” is often framed in terms of a nonrepresentationalist theory of meaning. While some neopragmatists, such as Robert Brandom, advocate a more local approach, this article argues for taking Price's global expressivism to its next logical step: global pragmatism. Global pragmatism prioritizes the behavior‐guiding function of language and redefines representation in operational terms. This operational approach (“o‐representation”) stresses the action and conduct‐guiding role of language use, highlights the connection between meaning and action, and addresses issues facing Price's global expressivism.     

Introduction

The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume.     

Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality,intentionalism, and non-propositional contents

This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.     

早期现代哲学中的语言问题

The view of language is greatly changed from early modern philosophy to later modern philosophy and to postmodern philosophy. The linguistic question in early modern philosophy, which is characterized by rationalism and empiricism, is discussed in this paper. Linguistic phenomena are not at the center of philosophical reflections in early modern philosophy. The subject of consciousness is at the center of the philosophy, which makes language serve purely as an instrument for representing thoughts. Locke, Leibniz and Descartes consider language from a representationalist point of view. To them, language itself is idealized and represents thought as if it were thought representing itself. Like the structural linguist Saussure, the founders of phenomenology and analytical philosophy give much attention to the logical or static structure of language, and stick up for the representationalism of early modern philosophy. However, their successors refuse to accept this attitude, meaning the final collapse of representationalism. Translated by Cui Zengbao and Yang Dachun from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2007, (8): 62–67     

Stained glass as a model for consciousness

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have not yet definitively established externalism, they have indeed made it quite intuitive. Internalism, by comparison, comes across at first sight as antiquated and ridden with difficulties. This is why I propose the Stained Glass model of consciousness. I do so with the following two aims: first, to make internalism intuitive in the age of transparency, and second, to show how to resist the many recent anti-internalist arguments. In particular, I argue that phenomenal internalism need not be epistemically worrisome, that it is compatible at once with transparency, representationalism, and content externalism, and that although it requires an error theory, this error theory is a harmless one.     

Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences ‘Vivid’ and Others ‘Faint’? Representationalism,Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology

One central brand of representationalism claims that the specific phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its content. A challenge for this view is that cognitive and perceptual experiences sometimes seem to have the same representational content while differing in phenomenal character. In particular, it might seem that one can have faint imagery experiences or conscious thoughts with the same contents as vivid perceptual experiences. This paper argues that such cases never arise, and that they are probably metaphysically impossible. I also suggest a fully representational account of differences in vividness between phenomenal experiences.     

The intuitive case for naïve realism

Naïve realism, the view that perceptual experiences are irreducible relations between subjects and external objects, has intuitive appeal, but this intuitive appeal is sometimes thought to be undermined by the possibility of certain kinds of hallucinations. In this paper, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism, and explain why this intuitive case is not undermined by the possibility of such hallucinations. Specifically, I present the intuitive case for naïve realism as arguing that the only way to make sense of the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences is by means of a naïve realist ontology. I then explain why this intuitive argument is not undermined by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences that possess the phenomenal character associated with perceptual experiences but, being hallucinations, do not have the ontological nature specified by naïve realism.     

激进生成论及其反表征主义革命

生成论是当代具身认知科学中的一个新取向。它反对传统认知科学中的表征主义观点,主张心智并非认识者对环境信息的表征和加工,而是行动的制造者,是特定身体构造和身体能力的行动者与环境的互动与耦合过程。激进生成论认为自创生的生成论和感觉运动的生成论在反对表征主义方面过于“温和”。因此,它主张“激进化”生成论,强调基本心智就是一种反应形式,不包含任何内容性心理表征。因此,它要掀起一场反表征主义“革命”。这一激进主张受到来自左右两方面的批评。