EXPLANATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO SEGAL WITH COMMENT ON THE ZYGON EXCHANGE

Abstract. In the issue of Zygon devoted to methodological reflection on the boundaries between natural science, social science, and theology (September 1990), Edward 0. Wilson pointed to the hierarchical tension between disciplines and antidisciplines. Working within this framework, Robert Segal outlined several “misconceptions of social science” held by religionists who fear it reduces, or “explains away” their subject. Philip Gorski, Nancey Murphy, and Kenneth Vaux suggested greater harmony but left Segal's challenge largely unaddressed. Religionists, says Segal, distrust social science because they think it ignores “the believer's point of view,” denies the “irreducibility” of religion, prefers materialist and mechanical explanations, and denies religious truth. Do religionists really claim all, or just some of these things? Are some perhaps not misconceptions, but accurate understandings of a real conflict? This article contends that distinctions need to be made; that at most, the humanistic assumptions of religionists compete with only one form of social science–reductionism; and further, that where conflict does arise, it is scientifically beneficial. Religionists differ from theologians, who argue from confessional premises, but the two are allied in opposing reductionism. Precisely because it is genuine, the debate with reductionist social science promises to advance understanding.