孟子的心理学思想研究

该文较系统地论述了孟子的普通心理思想。主要问题是:心理学思想的基本观点,知虑心理思想,情欲心理思想,志意心理思想,智能心理思想,性习心理思想。     

NIETZSCHE AND UNAMUNO ON CONATUS AND THE AGAPEIC WAY OF LIFE

Unamuno saw in his defense of religious faith a response to Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Christian, agapeic way of life. To Nietzsche’s claim that engaging in this way of life is something antinatural and life-denying, insofar as it goes against the (alleged) natural tendency to increase one’s own power, Unamuno responded that an agapeic way of life is precisely a direct expression of this natural tendency. Far from being something that goes against our natural inclinations, Unamuno says, an agapeic way of life is a life-affirming exercise, something we are led to given our own natural condition. Hence, the aim of this essay is to comment on Unamuno’s criticism of Nietzsche and to point out the philosophical relevance of Unamuno’s attempt to provide a natural foundation for religious faith when assessing Nietzsche’s criticisms of the possibility of carrying out a Christian, agapeic way of life.     

Forcing you to experience wonder: Unconsciously biasing people’s choice through strategic physical positioning

Magicians have developed powerful tools to covertly force a spectator to choose a specific card. We investigate the physical location force, in which four cards (from left to right: 1-2-3-4) are placed face-down on the table in a line, after which participants are asked to push out one card. The force is thought to rely on a behavioural bias in that people are more likely to choose the third card from their left. Participants felt that their choice was extremely free, yet 60% selected the 3rd card. There was no significant difference in estimates and feelings of freedom between those who chose the target card (i.e. 3rd card) and those who selected a different card, and they underestimated the actual proportion of people who selected the target card. These results illustrate that participants’ behaviour was heavily biased towards choosing the third card, but were oblivious to this bias.     

Libet’s intention reports are invalid: A replication of Dominik et al. (2017)

In the “Libet experiment” the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet’s intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet’s intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.     

Perception of dynamic acoustic patterns by an individual with unilateral verbal auditory agnosia

Previous studies have found that subjects diagnosed with verbal auditory agnosia (VAA) from bilateral brain lesions may experience difficulties at the prephonemic level of acoustic processing. In this case study, we administered a series of speech and nonspeech discrimination tests to an individual with unilateral VAA as a result of left-temporal-lobe damage. The results indicated that the subject's ability to perceive steady-state acoustic stimuli was relatively intact but his ability to perceive dynamic stimuli was drastically reduced. We conclude that this particular aspect of acoustic processing may be a major contributing factor that disables speech perception in subjects with unilateral VAA.     

Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to do Otherwise

In his classic paper, The Principle of Alternate Possibilities, Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the compatibilists and the incompatibilists (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it -- since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.     

MIRACLES AND TWO ACCOUNTS OF SCIENTIFIC LAWS

Since early modernity, it has often been assumed that miracles are incompatible with the existence of the natural laws utilized in the sciences. This paper argues that this assumption is largely an artifact of empiricist accounts of laws that should be rejected for reasons internal to philosophy of science, and that no such incompatibility arises on the most important alternative interpretations, which treat laws as expressions of forces, dispositions, or causal powers.     

Downward causation and supervenience: the non-reductionist’s extra argument for incompatibilism

Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of supervenience or the assumption of bottom-level indeterminism. I will contend that the former alternative comes at a high cost, while the latter is quite plausible. Therefore, providing that they accept the condition of the truth of indeterminism, non-reductionist accounts of the agent do not have to contradict our scientific worldview. Interestingly, while they should be taken seriously by anyone who is concerned with the passivity of the agent’s role under a reductionist scenario, non-reductivist accounts end up contributing an extra incompatibilist argument to the free will debate.