Gendered Purity and Embodied Sexual Flourishing: Moral Agency,Development, and Prudence

Current popular accounts of sexual morality for adolescents based simply on purity or self-determination cannot adequately anchor a Christian sexual ethic, although positions based on both notions hope to facilitate sexual health among young females. Here I critique both popular Christian purity movements and a popular feminist critique of these purity movements (based upon self-determination) and suggest the virtue of prudence as a corrective. Situated within the Catholic theological tradition, prudence (practical wisdom) acknowledges the process of human moral and sexual development and is robust enough to negotiate the concrete complexities of sexual activity and the social realities in which such activity takes place. Further, it honours an embodied sense of female sexual self-determination: females as moral agents directed towards sexual flourishing.     

Supererogation Across Normative Domains

The phenomenon of moral supererogation—action that goes beyond what moral duty requires—is familiar. In this paper, I argue that the concept of supererogation is applicable beyond the moral domain. After an introductory section 1, I outline in section 2 what I take to be the structure of moral supererogation, explaining how it comes to be an authentic normative category. In section 3, I show that there are structurally similar phenomena in other normative domains—those of prudence, etiquette, and the epistemic—and give examples of acts of supererogation of each of these types.     

Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

For obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer.     

论《管子》的“谨慎”思想及其对现代的启迪

《管子》中多次论述了＂谨慎＂,告诫人们：＂昔者圣王本厚民生,审知祸福之所生,是故慎小事微,违非索辩以根之＂;＂君之所慎者四：一曰大德不至仁,不可以授国柄。二曰见贤不能让,不可与尊位。三曰罚避亲贵,不可使主兵。四曰不好本事,不务地利而轻赋敛,不可与都邑＂;＂欲民之谨小礼、行小义、修小廉、饬小耻、禁微邪,此厉民之道也。民之谨小礼、行小义、修小廉、饬小耻、禁微邪,治之本也＂,其思想对现代有启迪和现实意义。     

EMPATHY AND THE EVOLUTION OF COMPASSION: FROM DEEP HISTORY TO INFUSED VIRTUE

This article poses a challenge to contemporary theories in psychology that portray empathy as a negative force in the moral life. Instead, drawing on alternative psychological and philosophical literature, especially Martha Nussbaum, I argue that empathy is related to the virtue of compassion and therefore crucial for moral action. Evidence for evolutionary anthropological accounts of compassion in early hominins provides additional arguments for its positive value in deep human history. I discuss this work alongside Thomistic notions of practical wisdom, compassion, misericordia, and the importance of reason in the moral life. The tension between “bottom up” accounts of empathy and that according to a theological interpretation of “infused” virtues also needs to be addressed. From a secular perspective, infused virtue is a projection of the ideal moral life, but from a theological perspective, it is a way of understanding how human capacities through the action of grace can reach beyond what seem to be the limits of psychological moral identity.     

Fabricated Humans? Human Genetics,Ethics and the Christian Wisdom Tradition1

Abstract: This article highlights the key social issues associated with genetic screening and testing. It identifies an uneasy combination of a cultural drive towards perfection alongside heightened perception of a risk society. Awareness of risk is particularly in evidence in clinical genetics, but is surprisingly silent in public discourse about stem cell research, which has tended to flounder through its unilateral focus on the status of the early embryo. This article concentrates on current practice, such as the use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and offers a critical analysis of current debates about ethical issues. It argues that Christian ethics can contribute positively to the debate by drawing on the tradition of prudence or practical wisdom, which goes beyond the secular alternatives of both the consequential analysis of risk and benefit and the precautionary principle.     

Casuistry and Principlism: The Convergence of Method in Biomedical Ethics

Casuistry and principlism are two of the leading contenders to be considered the methodology of bioethics. These methods may be incommensurable since the former emphasizes the examination of cases while the latter focuses on moral principles. Conversely, since both analyze cases in terms of mid-level principles, there is hope that these methods may be reconcilable or complementary. I analyze the role of principles in each and thereby show that these theories are virtually identical when interpreted in a certain light. That is, if the gaps in each method are filled by a concept of judgment or Aristotelian practical wisdom, these methods converge.     

Creating Character: Aristotle on Habituation,the Cognitive Power of Emotion,and the Role of Prudence

For Aristotle creating a virtuous character means habituating a stable emotional state or disposition (hexis), which enables the agent to feel and act rightly, and to have the intellectual virtue prudence (phronēsis) complete this habituation. But because feeling or emotion (pathos) is a passive state, it is not clear in what way we can make ourselves be affected correctly. This paper tries to solve this apparent difficulty by emphasizing the cognitive power of emotion. It also examines the role of prudence in the acquisition of ethical virtue, supporting an anti-intellectualist understanding of practical motivation.     

Hypothetical Retrospection

Moral theory has mostly focused on idealized situations in which the morally relevant properties of human actions can be known beforehand. Here, a framework is proposed that is intended to sharpen moral intuitions and improve moral argumentation in problems involving risk and uncertainty. Guidelines are proposed for a systematic search of suitable future viewpoints for hypothetical retrospection. In hypothetical retrospection, a decision is evaluated under the assumption that one of the branches of possible future developments has materialized. This evaluation is based on the deliberator’s present values, and each decision is judged in relation to the information available when it was taken. The basic decision rule is to choose an alternative that comes out as morally acceptable (permissible) from all hypothetical retrospections.

Medieval Consideration and Moral Pace

This essay examines the relationship between virtue and understandings of time through a comparative examination of two medieval Christian writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas. By locating temporal dimensions of virtue primarily in discussions of prudence, this essay compares Thomas's account of the virtue of counsel as preparatory to prudent judgment with Bernard's earlier account of consideration as an integrating virtue that coordinates an examination of physical surroundings and social responsibilities with an examination of one's own inner life and history of moral decisions. The essay argues that accounts of virtue ethics focusing on tradition‐specific views of the human good and practical reasoning are insufficient if they do not also examine how practical reasoning interprets and responds to religious interpretations of time that disclose the distinctive kinds of moral problems arising in each historical period.