Weak Consistency for Ensuring Priority Vectors Reliability

Consistency and transitivity are important and leading research topics in the study of decision‐making in terms of pairwise comparison matrices. In this paper, we search for conditions that, in case of inconsistency, guarantee ordinal compatibility between ordinal ranking (actual ranking) derived from a transitive matrix and cardinal rankings provided by the most usual priority vectors proposed in the scientific literature. We provide the notion of weak consistency; it is a condition weaker than consistency and stronger than transitivity and ensures that vectors associated with a matrix, by means of a strictly increasing synthesis functional, provide a preference order, on the related set of decision elements, equal to the actual ranking. This notion extends, to the case in which the decision‐maker can be indifferent between two or more alternatives/criteria, weak consistency introduced in previous papers under constraint of no indifference. Finally, we introduce an order relation on the rows of the matrix, that is, a simple order if and only if weak consistency is satisfied; this simple order allows us to easily determine the actual ranking on the set of decision elements. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pavlovian george windholz (1931–2002): An exemplar of scholarly “observation and observation” and a critical contributor to psychology,and hence to behavioral neuroscience

Although most members of the Pavlovian Society properly focus their efforts on empirical research, the scholarly, critical conceptual contributions of some individuals are also relevant to progress in psychology and behavioral neuroscience. This paper discusses the contributions of the late George Windholz (often in collaboration with Peter Lamal) as: (a) a historian of Pavlov’s life, and work; (b) an analyst of priority issues in psychology as a science; (c) a refuter of myths perpetrated by psychology texts. These contributions provide an example of the scholarly form of the motto “observation and observation,” where the data used to test hypotheses comprise original documents (often in languages other than English) examined by the historian’s critical eye.     

医学专科能力评审的争议及规避策略

医院的医学重点专科建设是医院发展的重要战略,如何认定某医院某专科为地方的重点专科,是一个系统工程。地方卫生行政主管部门如何把握评审认定标准,展示政府执政的公正公平,是十分敏感的问题,它蕴藏着很大的风险。在重点专科的评定过程中如何体现政府形象,规避行政风险,需要认真探讨。结合某市重点专科检查的实际情况进行分析,就此种争议及规避策略提出建议。     

Shame,Stigma, and Disgust in the Decent Society

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? “No,” says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum’s view that to respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust.     

Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative

The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons. I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response. I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’ phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.

团队决策及其影响因素

随着组织结构的变化,团队决策为越来越多的组织所采用。该文将团队决策的研究范式概括为以下四类：社会决策图式（social decision scheme, SDS）、信息取样模型（information sampling model）、项目排序任务（ranking item task）团队以及组织中以安全优先的团队（safety priority team）;并从影响团队决策的因素,提高团队决策质量的策略等角度分别对四类团队决策的研究进行探讨,在此基础上本文对未来研究进行了展望     

Equality, Priority and Person-Affecting Value

Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as person-affecting in a weaker sense. Thirdly, it is possible to construct a Relational version of the Priority View which incorporates the Egalitarian value of just equality in this sense. Two reasons are given for why this Relational View and Egalitarianism are superior to the Parfitian Absolute Priority View. However, no attempt is made to abjudicate between the first two views, the main point being that they both accept the value of just equality in the same sense.     

Examining Transfer Effects of Dual-Task Training Protocols for a Complex Locomotor Task

Training protocols designed to improve dual-task performance of an obstacle crossing and auditory Stroop task (OBS+Stroop) were tested. In Experiment 1, following baseline collection of OBS+Stroop trials, proximally related walking training was performed, and participants were then retested on the OBS+Stroop test. After training, participants adopted a more cautious obstacle crossing strategy, indicating a potentially safer navigation strategy. Transfer effects from distally related training were then examined (Experiment 2); a computer game training paradigm was examined using the same testing protocol as Experiment 1. Computer training demonstrated improved dual-task performance on some measures, but did not induce a more cautious stepping strategy. Results indicate that dual-task training needs to be similar to targeted tasks to yield reliable, positive training outcomes.     

How Philosophers Appeal to Priority to Effect Revolution

This article argues that philosophers tend to employ a particular method in constructing their theories and critiquing their opponents. To substantiate this claim, the article examines the work of Nietzsche and Locke, the Empiricists and Rationalists, Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida, and Russell and Wittgenstein, showing how each relies on a method the article labels “revolution‐through‐return.” The method consists in identifying the authority behind your opponent's theory, then appealing to something “prior to” that authority, from which you then proceed to derive your own theory. The article distinguishes between several senses of priority (temporal, ontological, axiological, and so on), argues that modern philosophers tend to rely on temporal priority, and discusses the questions in priority theory that need to be addressed in order evaluate and construct revolution‐through‐return arguments.