Higher inhibitory control is required to escape the innate attraction to effort minimization

Recent evidence suggests humans have an automatic attraction to effort minimization. Yet, how this attraction is associated with response inhibition is still unclear. Here, we used go/no-go tasks to capture inhibitory control in response to stimuli depicting physical activity versus physical inactivity in 59 healthy young individuals. Higher commission errors (i.e., failure to refrain a response to a “no-go” stimulus) indicated lower inhibitory control. Based on the energetic cost minimization theory, we hypothesized that participants would exhibit higher commission errors when responding to physical inactivity stimuli rather than physical activity stimuli. Mixed effects models showed that, compared to physical activity stimuli, participants exhibited higher commission errors when responding to stimuli depicting physical inactivity (odds ratio = 1.59, 95% Confidence Interval = 1.18 to 2.16, p = .003). These results suggest that physical inactivity stimuli might require high response inhibition. This study lends support for the hypothesis that an attraction to effort minimization might affect inhibitory processes in the presence of stimuli related to this minimization. The study pre-registration form can be found at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/RKYHB.     

Psychological and behavioural effects of bone density screening for osteoporosis

Abstract

To examine the psychological effects of bone density measurement, 298 women were assessed two weeks before the bone density scan, immediately before the scan, after the results, a week later and three months later. For the group as a whole, ratings of anxiety and perceived vulnerability were lower at the three month follow-up than at the initial assessment. Women who received a low bone mineral density (BMD) result were more anxious and reported more osteoporosis-preventive behaviours at the three month follow-up than women who received a high BMD result; these differences had not been apparent at the initial assessment Women with low BMD results had higher ratings of perceived vulnerability after the scan, although for some of these ratings there were group differences before the scan. Women with a low BMD result showed a decrease in ratings of the seriousness of a below-average result, which may reflect minimization of the health threat     

Priors in perception: Top-down modulation,Bayesian perceptual learning rate,and prediction error minimization

I discuss top-down modulation of perception in terms of a variable Bayesian learning rate, revealing a wide range of prior hierarchical expectations that can modulate perception. I then switch to the prediction error minimization framework and seek to conceive cognitive penetration specifically as prediction error minimization deviations from a variable Bayesian learning rate. This approach retains cognitive penetration as a category somewhat distinct from other top-down effects, and carves a reasonable route between penetrability and impenetrability. It prevents rampant, relativistic cognitive penetration of perception and yet is consistent with the continuity of cognition and perception.     

Predictions,precision, and agentive attention

Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. But that story, Ransom et al. suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project fails. It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs.     

Projection of a binary criterion into a model of hierarchical classes

A formal analysis is made of how to project an attribute criterion into the hierarchical classes model for object by attribute data proposed by De Boeck and Rosenberg. The projection is conceptualized as the prediction of the attribute criterion by means of a logical rule defined on the basis of attribute combinations from the model. Eliminative and constructive strategies are proposed to find logical rules with maximal predictive power and minimal formula complexity. Logical analyses of a real data set are reported and compared with a logistic regression to demonstrate the usefulness of the logical strategies, and to show the complementarity of logical and probabilistic approaches.The first suthor is Senior Research Assistant of the National Fund for Scientific Research (Belgium). We would like to thank the Editor, the reviewers, Seymour Rosenberg, and Luc Delbeke for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.     

Lower bounds for the reliability of the total score on a test composed of non-homogeneous items: II: A search procedure to locate the greatest lower bound

Finding the greatest lower bound for the reliability of the total score on a test comprisingn non-homogenous items with dispersion matrix Σ _x is equivalent to maximizing the trace of a diagonal matrix Σ _E with elements θ _I , subject to Σ _E and Σ _T =Σ _x − Σ _E being non-negative definite. The casesn=2 andn=3 are solved explicity. A computer search in the space of the θ _i is developed for the general case. When Guttman's λ₄ (maximum split-half coefficient alpha) is not the g.l.b., the maximizing set of θ _i makes the rank of Σ _T less thann − 1. Numerical examples of various bounds are given. Present affiliation of the first author: St. Hild's College of Education, Durham City, England.     

The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

Gender and Roles in a Hospital Setting

No abstract available for this article.     

SIMPLIFYING HEURISTICS VERSUS CAREFUL THINKING: SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF MILLENNIAL SPIRITUAL ISSUES

There is ample evidence that humans (and other primates) possess a knowledge instinct—a biologically driven impulse to make coherent sense of the world at the highest level possible. Yet behavioral decision‐making data suggest a contrary biological drive to minimize cognitive effort by solving problems using simplifying heuristics. Individuals differ, and the same person varies over time, in the strength of the knowledge instinct. Neuroimaging studies suggest which brain regions might mediate the balance between knowledge expansion and heuristic simplification. One region implicated in primary emotional experience is more activated in individuals who use primitive heuristics, whereas two areas of the cortex are more activated in individuals with a strong knowledge drive: one region implicated in detecting risk or conflict and another implicated in generating creative ideas. Knowledge maximization and effort minimization are both evolutionary adaptations, and both are valuable in different contexts. Effort minimization helps us make minor and routine decisions efficiently, whereas knowledge maximization connects us to the beautiful, to the sublime, and to our highest aspirations. We relate the opposition between the knowledge instinct and heuristics to the biblical story of the fall, and argue that the causal scientific worldview is mathematically equivalent to teleological arguments from final causes. Elements of a scientific program are formulated to address unresolved issues.     

Transcending the evidentiary boundary: Prediction error minimization,embodied interaction,and explanatory pluralism

In a recent paper, Jakob Hohwy argues that the emerging predictive processing (PP) perspective on cognition requires us to explain cognitive functioning in purely internalistic and neurocentric terms. The purpose of the present paper is to challenge the view that PP entails a wholesale rejection of positions that are interested in the embodied, embedded, extended, or enactive dimensions of cognitive processes. I will argue that Hohwy’s argument from analogy, which forces an evidentiary boundary into the picture, lacks the argumentative resources to make a convincing case for the conceptual necessity to interpret PP in solely internalistic terms. For this reason, I will reconsider the postulation and explanatory role of the evidentiary boundary. I will arrive at an account of prediction error minimization and its foundation on the free energy principle that is fully consistent with approaches to cognition that emphasize the embodied and interactive properties of cognitive processes. This gives rise to the suggestion that explanatory pluralism about the application of PP is to be preferred over Hohwy’s explanatory monism that follows from his internalistic and neurocentric view of predictive cognitive systems.