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1.
Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle that classical physics (be it point-like analytic,
statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a
consequence of the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s
argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems – unit state vectors versus
non-idempotent density operators – we distinguish between strong/relational and weak/deconstructional forms of quantum nonseparability.
The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality
in forming a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also considered.
Finally, certain philosophical consequences of quantum non-separability concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question
of realism in quantum mechanics, and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its entirety
are explored. 相似文献
2.
Hanson SS 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(3):215-226
It is commonly assumed that persons who hold abortions to be generally impermissible must, for the same reasons, be opposed to embryonic stem cell research [ESR]. Yet a settled position against abortion does not necessarily direct one to reject that research. The difference in potentiality between the embryos used in ESR and embryos discussed in the abortion debate can make ESR acceptable even if one holds that abortion is impermissible. With regard to their potentiality, in vitro embryos are here argued to be more morally similar to clonable somatic cells than they are to in vivo embryos. This creates an important moral distinction between embryos in vivo and in vitro. Attempts to refute this moral distinction, raised in the recent debate in this journal between Alfonso Gómez-Lobo and Mary Mahowald, are also addressed. 相似文献
3.
George RP 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2004,25(1):3-20
The author, a member of the U.S.President's Council on Bioethics, discussesethical issues raised by human cloning, whetherfor purposes of bringing babies to birth or forresearch purposes. He first argues that everycloned human embryo is a new, distinct, andenduring organism, belonging to the speciesHomo sapiens, and directing its owndevelopment toward maturity. He then distinguishesbetween two types of capacities belonging toindividual organisms belonging to this species,an immediately exerciseable capacity and abasic natural capacity that develops over time. He argues that it is the second type ofcapacity that is the ground for full moralrespect, and that this capacity (and itsconcomitant degree of respect) belongs tocloned human embryos no less than to adulthuman beings. He then considers and rejectscounter-arguments to his position, includingthe suggestion that the capacity of embryos isequivalent to the capacity of somatic cells,that full human rights are afforded only tohuman organisms with functioning brains, thatthe possibility of twinning diminishes themoral status of embryos, that the fact thatpeople do not typically mourn the loss of earlyembryos implies that they have a diminishedmoral status, that the fact that earlyspontaneous abortions occur frequentlydiminishes the moral status of embryos, andthat his arguments depend upon a concept ofensoulment. He concludes that if the moralstatus of cloned human embryos is equivalent tothat of adults, then public policy should bebased upon this assumption. 相似文献
4.
Gómez-Lobo A 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2005,26(2):105-110
In order to understand the nature of human embryos I first distinguish between active and passive potentiality, and then argue that the former is found in human gametes and embryos (even in embryos in vitro that may fail to be implanted) because they all have an indwelling power or capacity to initiate certain changes. Implantation provides necessary conditions for the actualization of that prior, active potentiality. This does not imply that embryos are potential persons that do not deserve the same respect as actual persons. To claim that embryos become persons is to understand the predicate person as a phase sortal, roughly equivalent to adult person. This entails that we would not be essentially persons. In order to explain the traditional understanding of person as a proper sortal rather than a phase sortal, the author distinguishes between proximate and remote potentiality, and shows that, unlike feline embryos, human embryos, by their genetic constitution, possess the remote potentiality to later exercise the typically human activities. It follows that they are already persons essentially. 相似文献
5.
CAO Qingyun 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2012,7(4):550
It is controversial whether δ?ναμι? in Metaphysics Book Θ has two distinct senses, one of which is strict, called “power,” and the other is the “more useful sense,” called “potentiality.” This paper argues that there are indeed two senses of δ?ναμι? in Metaphysics Θ, refuting Michael Frede’s “unitarian interpretation.” Distinguished from power, potentiality is neither Aristotelian nature, nor possibility, nor capacity for being, but rather a way of being. This paper examines the ontological meanings and the features of potentiality as a way of being. Basically, potentiality has a dual status, that is, it is being, on the one hand, and not-being on the other. Furthermore, it has a teleological direction toward its correlative actuality, which explains how potentiality ontologically depends on actuality and why actuality is substantially prior to potentiality. 相似文献
6.
Antje Jackeln 《Zygon》2006,41(4):955-974
Unique epistemological challenges arise whenever one embarks on the critical and self‐critical reflection of the nature of time and the end of time. I attempt to construct my preference for an eschatological distinction between time and eternity from within a middle way, avoiding both the hubris that claims complete comprehension and the resignation that concedes readily to know nothing. Surveying the history of reflection on this multifaceted question of time, with its ephemeral and everlasting dimensions, I argue that the eschatological interplay between the “already” and the “not yet” has much to offer: promise for the religion‐science dialogue as well as hope for humanity, especially for those on society's bleakest edges. But understandings of time, to be authentically theological, must be also informed by cosmology and the physics of relativity. My proposal seeks to respect the theological and scientific interpretations of the nature of time, serving the ongoing, creative interaction of these disciplines. Between physics and theology I identify four formal differences in analyzing eschatology, all grounded in the one fundamental difference between extrapolation and promise. Discussion of what I term deficits in both the scientific and theological approaches leads to further examination of the complex relationship between time and eternity. I distinguish three models of such relationships, which I label the ontological, the quantitative, and the eschatological distinction between time and eternity. Because of the way it embraces a multiplicity of times, especially relating to the culmination and the consummation of creation, I opt for the eschatological model. The eschatological disruption of linear chronology relates well to relativ‐istic physics: This model is open, dynamic, and relational, and it may add a new aspect to the debate over the block universe. 相似文献
7.
Andrew McGee 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(4-5):689-706
Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to possess—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo. 相似文献
8.
Gómez-Lobo A 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2004,25(3):199-208
Respect for human embryos is often defended on the basis of the potentiality argument: embryos deserve respect because they already possess potentially the features that in adults are fully actualized. Opponents of this argument challenge it by claiming that if embryos should be respected because they are potentially adults, then gametes should be respected because they are potentially embryos. This article rejects this reductio ad absurdum argument by showing that there are two different types of potentiality involved so that the transitivity of potentiality does not hold up in this case. Respect for embryos does not logically entail respect for gametes. 相似文献
9.
Lothar Schfer 《Zygon》2006,41(3):573-582
Abstract. I respond to Ervin Laszlo's suggestions and criticism regarding my essay in this issue of Zygon. Virtual atomic orbitals are used as a model to illustrate the existence of a general realm of potentiality in physical reality from which the actual world emanates. Laszlo's suggestions for “paradigm repair” are supported and accepted as essentially being in agreement with my intentions and as offering highly useful clarifications. I compare virtual states to historic ideas of forms as metaphysical principles of being that inspire thoughts regarding the actions of a Cosmic Consciousness in the processes of the universe. Metaphysical and theological interpretations of the results of scientific research are defended, provided that they are not used to interfere a priori with the technical program of scientific research. 相似文献
10.
James E. Huchingson 《Zygon》2005,40(3):751-758
Abstract. Systems theory provides a surprisingly fruitful approach to several important ideas held in common by Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These include complexity or organization as the key to understanding the distinction between the inorganic and the organic, and hierarchy or levels in complex systems. Teilhard and systems theorists accept hierarchy as fundamental. Tillich questions the concept and prefers “dimensions,” including the inorganic, organic, psychological, spiritual, and historical dimensions. Tillich's rejection of hierarchy is questioned, but significant correlations are discovered in the systems interpretation of the psychological and spiritual dimensions as well as in the use of “centeredness” by both thinkers. 相似文献