Rare Constructions Are More Often Sentence‐Initial

Main clause phenomena (MCPs) are syntactic constructions that occur predominantly or exclusively in main clauses. I propose a processing explanation for MCPs. Sentence processing is easiest at the beginning of the sentence (requiring less search); this follows naturally from widely held assumptions about sentence processing. Because of this, a wider variety of constructions can be allowed at the beginning of the sentence without overwhelming the sentence‐processing mechanism. Unlike pragmatic and grammatical accounts of MCPs, the processing account predicts avoidance of MCPs in non‐initial main clauses (non‐initial coordinate clauses and premodified clauses). A corpus study supports these predictions, but it is somewhat inconclusive. A further corpus study examines another type of syntactic construction, premodifying adjunct phrases (“openers”); the prediction here is that less common types of opener will be especially avoided in non‐initial contexts. The prediction is confirmed, supporting the processing view of rare constructions.     

Identity, narcissism and the emotional core

This paper describes the course of an analysis which demonstrates how borderline and narcissistic functioning can be understood in terms of a struggle with issues of identity. It shows how such functioning can come to exert a profound hold on the individual and why it seems, at times, a matter of life and death to the patient to avoid states of separation from the analyst. The paper suggests that these complex phenomena can be understood, perhaps surprisingly, in the simple terms of the nature of affect itself. The concept of the emotional core is introduced to embody and highlight that which lies beneath both Jungian and Freudian models (offering a potential bridge between the two models)--namely the psyche's essentially affective nature. It is suggested that the emotional core can serve as an organ of perception giving the individual both their primary relation to reality and an emotional attachment to others. This emotional core is understood to function in a narcissistic manner to preference experiences of sameness and in aversion to experiences of difference--a view consonant with Stern's understanding of infant development where the infant is able to distinguish self from other from the beginning of life (as Fordham also held); taking up Stern's terminology, it gives the individual a 'core' sense of being. There is, however, no stable, on-going sense of 'I' associated with this form of functioning as the individual is immersed in the latest affect to enter consciousness (as in the borderline state of mind) and consequently the individual comes to rely intensely on the other to determine their sense of being (the other becomes a self-regulating other in Stern's terms). The development of ego-functioning gives a more stable and on-going sense of 'I' to the individual, giving contact with the broader personality, allowing the individual to be less reliant on the other and orientating them to reality in a way more fitting to their overall needs. The paper describes how consciousness, which is not seen as identical with the ego, moves between the mode of functioning of the ego and that of the emotional core, i.e., shifting in and out of states where projective identification predominates. It elaborates the range of self-experience encompassing spiritual experience and states of disintegration (which are understood to have a similar structure) on one side, to ego-based experience (which can itself be defensive and rigid at times) on the other. It explores the consequences of such a view for analytic technique and relates it to the Jungian view of the self and the Freudian unconscious.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

On some common objections to a behavioral approach to psychological categories

This paper addresses several objections that have been leveled against a behavioral approach to psychological categories. It reconstructs and critically assesses (a) the so-called causal objection; (b) alleged counterexamples whereby one can exhibit the typical behaviors associated with a psychological phenomenon without exhibiting the latter, including Lewis’ “perfect actor” case and Kirk’s “zombie”; (c) alleged counterexamples whereby organisms can exemplify psychological phenomena without exhibiting any behavior associated with them, including Armstrong’s imagined brain in a vat, Putnam’s “super-super-spartans” scenario, and related cases; and (d) the holistic objection. Mistaken assumptions in each of these objections are pinpointed. The paper starts with a brief characterization of behaviorism about psychological categories and a summary of the particular version thereof supported here, which draws upon Ryle and Skinner, among others.     

汉代象数学家的人文情怀

汉代象数学家历来被认为是只参天象不释人事,本文以孟京学派和《易纬》为例,通过对其象数学的深层分析,认为孟京讲卦气、讲天象,目的正是为了察人事、定人伦以明王道;《易纬》更显示了教化人民的道德意识和治国安邦的政治理念。前者以经学形式、后者以神学形式表达了各自强烈的人文情怀。     

Integrating Psychology within the Globalizing World: A <Emphasis Type="Italic">Requiem</Emphasis> to the Post-Modernist Experiment with <Emphasis Type="Italic">Wissenschaft</Emphasis>

Since the new beginning in 2007 of Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science we have brought out to the open both the reasons why the ever-widening research enterprise in psychology has largely failed to produce general knowledge, and to point to promising new directions in the field. The post-modernist turn in psychology is now over, and it is an interesting task to return to creating a universal science of psychology that is context-sensitive, and culture-inclusive. The latter goal entails a renewed focus upon qualitative analyses of time-based processes, close attention to the phenomena under study, and systematic (single-system-based—usually labeled idiographic) focus in empirical investigations. Through these three pathways centrality of human experiencing of culturally constructed worlds is restored as the core of psychological science. Universal principles are evident in each and every single case. Transcending post-modernist deconstruction of science happens through active international participation and a renewed focus on creating general theories. Contemporary psychology is global in ways that no longer can any country’s socio-political world view dominate the field. Such international equality of contributions grants innovation of the core of the discipline, and safeguards it against assuming any single cultural myth-story as the axiomatic basis for the discipline.

Autoscopic phenomena and one's own body representation in dreams

Autoscopic phenomena (AP) are complex experiences that include the visual illusory reduplication of one’s own body. From a phenomenological point of view, we can distinguish three conditions: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experiences. The dysfunctional pattern involves multisensory disintegration of personal and extrapersonal space perception. The etiology, generally either neurological or psychiatric, is different. Also, the hallucination of Self and own body image is present during dreams and differs according to sleep stage. Specifically, the representation of the Self in REM dreams is frequently similar to the perception of Self in wakefulness, whereas in NREM dreams, a greater polymorphism of Self and own body representation is observed. The parallels between autoscopic phenomena in pathological cases and the Self-hallucination in dreams will be discussed to further the understanding of the particular states of self awareness, especially the complex integration of different memory sources in Self and body representation.     

Illusory smoke and dazzling fog

It is well known that a flat ellipse rotating in the frontoparallel plane appears, after brief inspection, as a rigid circular disc tilting back and forth in a 3-D space. We here report that rotation of a grey-shaded ellipse on a white or on a black background produces the compelling illusion of a dark smoke or a dazzling fog (depending on the conditions of the background) moving in front of a completely white or completely black tilting disc. The fog effect disappears when there is a luminance contrast all along the perimeter of the ellipse. An experiment is reported showing that the effect can be experienced in static conditions only to a limited extent and mostly in the `dazzling' version, and that relative movement between the contours of the figure and the shaded area is crucial to the occurrence of the effect, while the occurrence of a depth effect is not. Received: 25 February 1999 / Accepted: 11 April 2000     

Depression and Anxiety in Persons with Parkinson's Disease With and Without “On–Off” Phenomena

On–off phenomena in Parkinson's disease (PD) are unpredictable motor fluctuations associated with long-term levodopa use. Mood fluctuations have been found to coincide with the motor fluctuations in that depression and anxiety increase while the person with PD is in the off state. What has been relatively unexplored is whether those persons with PD who have on–off phenomena differ psychologically in fundamental ways from those who do not have on–off phenomena. In the present study, depression and anxiety symptoms were assessed in 36 persons with PD (n = 14 with on–off phenomena, n = 22 without on–off phenomena). All those with on–off phenomena were assessed in their on state. Those persons with PD with on–off phenomena had significantly higher levels of anxiety than those without on–off phenomena. However, both groups, regardless of on–off status, were mildly depressed. Neurobiological interpretations of the results implicate the locus coeruleus in the pathogenesis of both on–off phenomena and anxiety, whereas psychological interpretations of the results involve the issues of learned helplessness and control over health symptoms in PD.     

Perceived organizational structure for teacher liking: the role of peers’ perceptions of teacher liking in teacher–student relationship quality,motivation, and achievement

Previous research has identified the role of perceived peer hierarchies, or organizational structures, in affecting students’ adjustment to school (Lease et al. 2003, Journal of Early Adolescence, 23, 194–217). The purpose of this study was to examine whether middle school classrooms can be described in terms of the perceived status individual students hold for who will and will not be ‘liked’ by the teacher. Specifically we examined: (1) Do students share a mutually agreed on representation, a perceived organizational structure, for describing relative status with their teacher? (2) Are teachers perceived as systematically favoring girls or boys? (3) Are peers’ perceptions of teacher liking associated with individual students’ social and academic motivation and relationship quality with teachers? (4) Are students identified by peers as ‘not liked’ at risk for long-term teacher rejection and underachievement? And, (5) What are the underlying criteria students use to judge teacher likeability? Data for this study were drawn from peer ratings from 516 (262 boys, 254 girls) middle school students in 20 classrooms. Findings indicate multidimensional scaling techniques can be used to map the ‘teacher-liking space,’ accounting for  > 90% of the variability in peers’ ratings of teacher likeability. Additionally, findings indicate perceived status in the teacher-liking space has consequences for students’ achievement and teacher relationship quality.