PERSONHOOD AND CREATION IN AN AGE OF ROBOTS AND AI: CAN WE SAY “YOU” TO ARTIFACTS?

This article explores the extent to which the I-You relation should be applied to domains other than the human and the divine focusing particularly on artifacts and technology. Drawing first on the work of Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, and Martin Heidegger, I contend that the I-You tradition has maintained I-You relations with objects are possible even when these same figures level strong critiques of the I-It relation. I extend these discussions and argue that some kind of You-speaking for artifacts is needed to combat rampant consumption and reduction of the world to pure utility. But, I equally suggest that there are limitations to applying the I-You relation to artifacts precisely when doing so keeps us from having genuine relationships with other people as outlined by psychologist Sherry Turkle. Finally, I outline how this proposal impacts the doctrine of creation. In sum, it expands our intuitions of what is included in that doctrine creation.     

Sexual ethics and communal judgments: on the pluralism of virtues, values, and practices.

Different judgments by Christian communities on issues in sexual ethics involve different weightings of various sources of moral authority, different understandings of the normativity of the natural, and different assessments of the scope of freedom to be exercised in relation to the goods of marriage. These fundamental differences of interpretation can be exemplified by the ongoing Roman Catholic discussion of the legitimacy of voluntary sterilization in certain "hard cases." The contributors to this issue of Christian Bioethics, in their spirited exchange on that issue, exemplify the need for careful attention to the ways that differences of theological emphasis and moral method lead to different judgements in particular cases, both within and between particular Christian communities.     

Critical Dogmatics as Paradigm

Theology as “critical dogmatics” points to a way forward between naturalism and constructivism in thought “after modernity.” It urges neither pre‐critical dogmatics nor modern systematizing, but a proposal for a pragmatic and hermeneutical theology making a single claim to truth about God as the One determined to redeem and fulfill the creation through the missions of God's Son and Spirit. This article clarifies the difference between Rudolph Bultmann's program of demythologization, and more generally, dialectical theology's antinomy of “the word of God and the word of humans,” and the sense of “deliteralization” in the strong trinitarian personalism of critical dogmatics.     

“Impersonalismus” und die “Werdende Vernunft der Wahrheit” in Solov'evs Spätphilosophie

Studies in East European Thought - Is Solovyov's philosophy pantheistic, is the individual absorbed by the absolute? Ehlen investigates Solovyov's late “Teoreti?eskaja...     

I through thou,and we through I: Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla on the personal foundation of community

This article is an attempt to scrutinize the phenomenological social ontology of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla by drawing on the particular role and nature of interpersonal relatedness and second-person engagement in the constitution of first-person-plural perspective. Both Hildebrand and Wojtyla endorse the unique value of the person and personality as the foundational principle for different dimensions of community, including the face-to-face “I-thou” way of being together and more complex, even anonymous, we communities. Both philosophers deny the constitutive primacy of first-person plural over first-person singular, the only exception being the mystical body of Christ when “I” is conditioned and formed by “we.” Moreover, what they have in common is the critical reappraisal of one stream in the phenomenological movement, first and foremost associated with Max Scheler's conception of the possibility of a “collective person.” Drawing on Hildebrand's and Wojtyla's accounts, the article endorses the view regarding the relational character of “I,” “thou,” and “we,” claiming that “we” hinges on an experiential dimension of “I.”     

ANIMALS,ANIMISTS, AND ACADEMICS

Abstract. Animism is the label given to worldviews in which the world is understood to be a community of living persons, only some of whom are human. (An older use of the term to label a putative “belief in spirits” is less useful.) Animists inculcate locally meaningful means of communicating with other‐than‐human persons, especially in order to express respect. Ethnographic accounts of particular animist ways of engaging with animal persons are noted. I argue that ethologists interested in engaging respectfully with animals while researching cognition, behavior, and other critical issues may find their research methods and results enhanced by learning from animists about tested methods of communicating with animals. The mediation of animists in this communicative engagement between animals and those who research among them is proposed not as a romantic gloss on modernist culture but in full recognition that the challenge offered by dialogue with marginalized and excluded “others” may result in a reconfiguration of academic protocols. Nonetheless, this entry into full relationality is seriously posed as an improved means of achieving established goals of understanding animals, humans, and the world we coinhabit.     

The persons‐in‐relation perspective: Towards a philosophy for counselling in society

This paper is the first in a planned series, which aims to articulate and synthesise the persons‐in‐relation perspective in counselling and psychotherapy, drawing together the contributions of the philosopher John Macmurray, the psychotherapist Ian Suttie and the psychoanalyst Ronald Fairbairn. The paper introduces the persons‐in‐relation perspective, derived from Macmurray's work. It outlines the historical and cultural context leading to the emergence of modernism, and the response of personalism. It summarises John Macmurray's life and philosophy, focusing on his account of knowledge, its relation to the senses and the emotions, and his view of persons, society and religion. The paper goes on to develop a hypothesis about the rise of counselling in Britain, linking it to the decline of religion, the conflict between individualism and collectivism, and the re‐emergence of the persons‐in‐relation perspective. It concludes by posing challenges for the person‐centred and psychodynamic orientations, and for counselling as a whole.     

PERSONS IN NATURE: TOWARD AN APPLICABLE AND UNIFIED ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Abstract. Two major contenders for the role of robust environmental ethics claim our allegiance. One is Baird Callicott's, based on the land ethic formulated by Aldo Leopold; the other is that of Holmes Rolston, 111, sharply distinguishing environmental from social (human) ethics. Despite their many strengths, neither gives us the vision we need. Callicott's ethic leaves too much out of his picture; Rolston's leaves too much disconnected between nature and humankind. A really usable environmental ethic needs to be both comprehensive and integrated. For that, we need a worldview that includes the human in nature but also affirms the unique values of personhood.     

In the Spirit of William James

In this essay, I identify several ways in which James Dittes extended the spirit of William James in his writings on psychology of religion. Like James, Dittes gave minimal attention to psychological theory and God-talk. Both authors located their reflections on religion within a philosophical, as well as a psychological, perspective. Both employed a discourse that was personalist, pluralist, and pragmatist. In the last section, I briefly note some of the ways in which Dittes moved beyond William James in the spirit of William James.     

威廉·斯特恩的儿童人格发展观及其历史效应

威廉·斯特恩是被历史遮蔽的现代儿童发展心理学的重要创建者,对儿童人格发展理论作出了原创性卓越贡献。他以批判人格主义为哲学基础提出了人文科学取向的儿童人格发展观,主要表现在整体论、过程论和情境论三个维面。他认为儿童人格发展是多元统一的整合性发展,是主动、动力、辩证、独特和开放的过程性发展,是内在于生活世界的情境性发展。他的观点为奥尔波特和勒温、维果茨基、皮亚杰、彪勒及里格尔等人的儿童发展理论提供了直接或间接思想来源。